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The influence of individual healthcare providers on healthcare utilization has important
implications for healthcare systems and cost savings policies. Primary care physicians may
be particularly influential because they have central, coordination roles in medicine, yet
little is known about their impacts on healthcare utilization. This dissertation provides new
empirical evidence on two fundamental questions. First, to what extent do differences in
practice styles of individual primary care physicians, as measured by their patients’ spending,
explain variation in healthcare utilization? Second, do patients incur switching costs in the
form of temporarily higher healthcare utilization when they switch PCPs? Specifically, I
study the long-run and short-run effects of switching to different primary care physicians on
patient healthcare utilization among traditional fee-for-service Original Medicare patients
who are ages 65-99 in the United States.
In the first chapter, I show that patients who switch from a primary care physician
whose other patients have low utilization to one whose other patients have high utilization
experience increases in long-run utilization, whereas patients who switch in the opposite
direction experience decreases. Regardless of the direction of the change, patients experience
short-run increases in utilization around the switch. Using a model that includes both patient
and physician fixed effects, I find that differences in primary care physician practice styles,
as measured by spending, explain about 2% of the variation in long-run total utilization and
about 13% of the variation in long-run primary care utilization within regional markets.
In the second chapter, I estimate the short-run effects of switching primary care physicians
on patient utilization. I focus on patients who involuntarily switch because their physicians
relocate or retire, such that the timing of the switches is exogenous. Each primary care
physician switch leads to approximately $500-725 in additional total utilization, and 20-30%
comes from temporary increases in primary care utilization. Combining my findings from
these two chapters, I construct counterfactuals and find that policies that reallocate patients
across primary care physicians could potentially be counterproductive due to modest long-run
savings and substantial short-run switching costs. Finally, I discuss potential mechanisms
that could generate these switching costs and their welfare implications.
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1Chapter 1
Influence of Primary Care Physician
Practice Styles in Healthcare Utilization
1.1 Introduction
A defining feature of the healthcare industry is the outsized role played by suppliers in
determining the overall demand for services (Arrow 1963, McGuire 2000). Differences in
physician agency and productivity are widely interpreted as key drivers of the wide regional
and local variation in U.S. healthcare utilization (see Chandra, Cutler, and Song 2011 and
Skinner 2011 for reviews). Among physicians, primary care physicians (PCPs) may be
particularly important because they hold information on patient medical history, informally
coordinate care, and in some cases, formally manage access to specialists. Though existing
research shows that PCP practice styles are correlated with differences in regional healthcare
variation (Sirovich et al. 2005; Sirovich et al. 2008), a major challenge that remains is
identifying the causal effects of PCPs on patient-level utilization.
Understanding the influence of individual physicians, particularly PCPs, on health-
care utilization has important policy implications. Supply-side polices rely on healthcare
providers to regulate and reduce spending using mechanisms such as clinical guidelines,
performance-based metrics, and monetary incentives. Demand-side policies induce patients
to switch to lower-cost healthcare providers using mechanisms such as high deductibles, price
transparency, and narrow provider networks. If PCP practice styles, as measured by spend-
ing, explain relatively little of variation in healthcare utilization, then the potential savings
from changing PCP practice styles or reallocating patients across PCPs may be small. More-
over, if switching between PCPs has non-trivial costs, then policies that reallocate patients
across PCPs may actually be counterproductive. Despite the central roles of PCPs, little
empirical evidence exists on the influence of individual PCP practice styles or the effects of
switching PCPs on patient-level utilization.
I investigate the influence of PCPs using administrative claims data for patients ages
65 and over in Original Medicare, commonly known as traditional fee-for-service Medicare,
between 1999 and 2012. Original Medicare is an ideal setting for my study because it covers
a large number of patients in a relatively uniform insurance environment and provides rich
administrative data on physician visits and other forms of healthcare utilization. Medicare
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patients have relatively frequent primary care visits, which allows me to match patients to
PCPs.1 During the sample period, PCPs were generally simply paid fee-for-service, which
means that I can measure PCP spending that is not affected by differences in direct mone-
tary incentives across PCPs.2 Though my findings cannot be directly extrapolated to private
insurance settings, the results serve as a benchmark for measuring PCP practice styles. Fur-
thermore, the policy implications even within Medicare are economically important because
Medicare accounts for 20% of U.S. national health expenditures and 3.6% of gross domestic
product.3
In a descriptive event study, I show that patients who switch from a PCP whose other
patients have low utilization to a PCP whose other patients have high utilization experience
increases in long-run utilization, whereas patients who switch from a PCP whose other
patients have high utilization to a PCP whose other patients have low utilization experience
decreases. Regardless of the direction of the change in PCP utilization, patients experience
short-run increases in utilization around the time of the PCP switch.
In my main analysis, I estimate the contribution of differences in PCP practice styles, as
measured by spending, to within-market variation in healthcare utilization.4 My empirical
strategy uses patients who switch PCPs to identify the components of utilization attributable
to patient characteristics (e.g., health, preferences) and the components attributable to PCP
practice styles. Specifically, I use a “two-way fixed effects” model that includes a patient fixed
effect, a PCP fixed effect, and a time-varying component that reflects changing patient and
market-level factors. This class of models has been recently used by Finkelstein, Gentzkow,
and Williams (2016) to examine regional variation in healthcare utilization and is widely
used in labor economics to separate effects of employer and employee characteristics in wage
determination (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999; Card, Heining, and Kline 2013).
The key identifying assumption in this setup is that switches between different types of PCPs
are unrelated to any patient-specific trends in healthcare utilization. My event study tests
for such trend-related switching patterns, and I find no evidence that patients who switch
to higher- or lower-spending PCPs systematically have rises or falls in utilization prior to or
after their switches in the long run.
Estimating the model separately for each of 306 hospital referral region (HRR) markets,
I find that differences in individual PCP practice styles contribute to approximately 2.4%
of variation in total healthcare utilization and 12.6% of variation in primary care utilization
within markets on average. Differences in time-invariant patient characteristics account for
approximately 28.4% of the variation in total healthcare utilization and 11.1% of the varia-
tion in primary care utilization.5 As in most healthcare settings, a large share of utilization
1I assign a PCP to 72% of patients in each quarter among patient-quarters eligible for PCP assignment
(as discussed in Sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.5).
2Under fee-for-service, services are unbundled and PCPs are paid for separately for each service they pro-
vide. Original Medicare more recently introduced performance-based incentives through Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs), such as in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, in which some PCPs participate.
3Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) National Health Expen-
diture Data (https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData).
4My markets are Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) as defined by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care
(http://archive.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region).
5The variance of patient-specific factors can be estimated on samples of only patients who switch PCPs
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variation cannot be explained by time-invariant PCP and patient factors due to time-varying
patient chronic conditions, health shocks, and other factors (e.g., clinical situation, see Chan-
dra, Cutler, and Song 2011). The influence of PCP practice styles estimated in this Original
Medicare setting is likely an approximate lower bound for the older U.S. population. Original
Medicare patients do not require referrals from their PCPs to see specialists, whereas PCPs
may have more influential roles as gatekeepers for Medicare Advantage health maintenance
organization (HMO) patients who do require referrals.
This chapter makes a few key contributions to the literature. First, this chapter is among
the first to estimate the influence of individual primary care physicians (PCPs) – who are
an central yet understudied part of healthcare – on healthcare utilization while accounting
for unobservable patient characteristics in a large U.S. population. The most closely related
paper on PCPs is one by Koulayev, Simeonova, and Skipper (2017), who estimate the con-
tribution of individual PCPs to drug adherence variation in Denmark using a two-way fixed
effects model. More broadly, my research relates to the estimation of the effects of individual
healthcare providers, including emergency department physicians (Gowrisankaran, Joiner,
and Léger 2017; Silver 2019; Van Parys 2016), emergency department triage nurses (Chan
and Gruber 2019), hospital physicians (Fletcher, Horwitz, and Bradley 2014; Tsugawa et
al. 2017), cardiac surgeons (Kolstad 2013), cardiologists (Currie, MacLeod, and Van Parys
2016), specialist physicians (Tu 2017), physician teams (Doyle, Ewer, and Wagner 2010),
and hospitals (Doyle et al. 2015). The existing literature generally relies on pseudo-random
assignment of patients to healthcare providers, often in emergency settings, to separately
identify provider effects from unobservable patient characteristics. Such pseudo-random as-
signment is rarely observed in primary care settings. As a result, I use a long panel of
administrative data and estimate the variance of PCP effects in a model that allows for un-
observable patient characteristics, allows for patient sorting across PCPs, and makes limited
assumptions on the patient to PCP assignment process.
Second, this chapter complements the existing literature on healthcare variation and
supplier-induced demand (e.g., Chandra, Cutler, and Song 2011; Cooper et al. 2019; Cutler
et al. 2019; Fisher 2003a, 2003b; Gruber and Owings 1996; Johnson and Rehavi 2016;
Skinner 2011; Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1973, 1982; Zhang et al. 2012). My study is most
similar in spirit to the seminal contribution by Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams (2016) in
that I also use a two-way fixed effects model to separately identify the contribution of patient-
specific factors and supply-specific factors to variation in healthcare utilization. In contrast
to Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams (2016), who decompose the contribution of patients
and places across healthcare markets, I estimate the contribution of primary care physicians
(PCPs) and patients to healthcare variation within each healthcare market (i.e., within each
place). My within-market estimates enable me to construct policy-relevant counterfactuals
that represent altering physician practice styles or reallocating patients across physicians
within the broader context of a fixed regional healthcare market.
Finally, this chapter relates to the broad literature that uses changes in locations or
institutions to separate individual characteristics from other (location/institutional-related)
factors. In health economics, studies use patient migration across healthcare markets (Agha,
Frandsen, and Rebitzer 2019; Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams 2016, 2019; Song et al.
(which exclude patients who never switch PCPs in the sample).
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2010) and counties (Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams 2018), patient changes in health
insurance providers (Handel et al. 2018), and physician migration across healthcare markets
(Molitor 2018).6 In this chapter, I separate primary care physician (PCP) practice styles
from patient factors by using patient changes in PCPs and explicitly estimate the effects
associated with the switches. I also apply recently available econometric methods (Kline,
Saggio, and Sølvsten 2018) to provide unbiased estimates of the variance in PCP fixed
effects given a setting and dataset in which the networks of PCPs and patients are weakly
connected and standard ordinary least squares regressions produce biased variance estimates
(Andrews et al. 2008). From a methodological perspective, I provide an empirical approach
to estimate both long-run effects and short-run effects of changes in locations or institutions
in a single, consistent framework that could be applied in other settings in which there may
be substantial switching costs (e.g., reallocation of employees across worksites or students
across schools).
This chapter proceeds with the following sections. Section 1.2 describes the context of my
study, the data, and the sample. Section 1.3 provides a descriptive analysis that motivates
my empirical framework. Section 1.4 describes the econometric model. Section 1.5 presents
my methodology for estimating the contribution of differences in physician practice styles
to healthcare variation, and Section 1.6 presents the results. Section 1.7 concludes with a
discussion of significance, limitations, and policy implications.
1.2 Context, Data, and Sample
1.2.1 Primary Care in Medicare
The context of my study is primary care for individuals ages 65 and older in Original Medi-
care, commonly known as traditional or fee-for-service Medicare. Original Medicare provides
an ideal setting for my study for several reasons. First, Original Medicare is national in its
coverage and is the predominant health insurance plan for individuals ages 65 and older in
the U.S. Over 90% all individuals age 65 or older are enrolled in Medicare, and 75-86% had
public Original Medicare rather than private Medicare Advantage during my study period
(Jacobson, Damico, et al. 2017; Smith and Medalia 2014). Original Medicare insurance is
nearly uniform across the U.S. in basic patient cost-sharing requirements.7,8
Second, Medicare beneficiaries – who I henceforth refer to as “patients” – generally have
primary care providers who they consider their usual sources of medical care, so PCPs are
6Other literatures also use this empirical strategy, such as worker employment switches across firms in
labor economics (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999; Card, Cardoso, Heining, and Kline 2018; Card,
Heining, and Kline 2013) and changes in various other settings (e.g., Bronnenberg, Dube, and Gentzkow
2012; Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014).
7See the Medicare “Medicare Costs at a Glance” webpage for an overview
(https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/medicare-costs-at-a-glance).
8Some Original Medicare patients also have Medicaid dual-eligibility, primary payers (payers who have
primary responsibility for the payment, e.g., employer group health plan, Department of Veteran Affairs), or
secondary payers (e.g., Medigap supplemental insurance). In ongoing work, I examine the influence of these
additional insurance factors in the context of my analysis. In the Medicare administrative claims data, I
observe Medicaid dual-eligibility and primary payers (both type of payer and payments), but not secondary
payers.
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very relevant to this population. Primary care includes disease prevention, health main-
tenance, the diagnosis and treatment of acute and chronic illnesses, and the coordination
and integration of medical care.9,10 Nearly all Medicare patients have usual sources of care
that they visit if they are sick or need advice about their health, and most of the individual
providers are PCPs.11,12 Medicare patients have relatively frequent primary care visits, so I
am able to match patients to PCPs.13
Patients in Original Medicare do not require referrals to see specialists and have access to
a relatively large network of physicians.14 In contrast, patients in private Medicare Advantage
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) require referrals to see specialists, and in some
cases, have more limited networks of physicians, so they may be more influenced by their
PCPs. I would interpret the influence of PCPs estimated in this study’s Original Medicare
context to be an approximate lower bound of the influence of PCPs on older patients because
PCPs have relatively small roles as coordinators and gatekeepers of care in Original Medicare.
Third, during the sample period, physicians were generally simply paid fee-for-service in
physician practice groups across the U.S., which means that I can measure PCP spending
that is not affected by differences in direct monetary incentives across PCPs.15 The Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) sets prices that are paid to physicians for services,
so unlike in private insurance markets, prices are not negotiated between healthcare providers
and insurers.16 Though some variation exists in the CMS administratively set prices that are
paid to healthcare providers, this price variation primarily exists across regions, so spending
differences are reflective of variation in utilization rather than variation in prices in my
within-region analyses (Gottlieb et al. 2010).17
Finally, Medicare patients have chronic conditions and relatively high health care costs,
9“Primary care is the level of a health services system that provides entry into the system for all new
needs and problems, provides person-focused (not disease-oriented) care over time, provides care for all
but very uncommon or unusual conditions, and coordinates or integrates care, regardless of where the care
is delivered and who provides it.” Source: https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-
hopkins-primary-care-policy-center/definitions.html.
10“Primary care includes health promotion, disease prevention, health maintenance, counseling, patient
education, diagnosis and treatment of acute and chronic illnesses in a variety of health care settings.” Source:
https://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/primary-care.html.
11The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey defines a usual source of care as “a particular doctor’s office,
clinic, health center, or other place that the individual usually goes to if he/she is sick or needs advice about
his/her health” (Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2009).
12Ninety-six percent of beneficiaries report having a usual source of care, primarily a doctor’s office or
doctor’s clinic (Boccuti et al. 2013). When patients report that they regard individual professionals, rather
than facilities, as their usual source of care, about 90% of the individual professionals are primary care
physicians (Mold et al. 2002). Patients who report a clinic, health center, or other place may still see a PCP
at that facility.
13I assign a PCP to 72% of patients in each quarter among patient-quarters eligible for PCP assignment
(as discussed in Sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.5).
14Ninety-one percent of non-pediatric physicians accept new Medicare patients (Boccuti et al. 2013).
15Under fee-for-service, services are unbundled and PCPs are paid for separately for each service they
provide. Original Medicare more recently introduced performance-based incentives through Accountable
Care Organizations (ACOs), such as in the Medicare Shared Savings Program.
16See the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule “Documentation and Files” webpage for details
(https://www.cms.gov/apps/physician-fee-schedule/documentation.aspx).
17My within-region estimates could be interpreted as including any remaining price differences. Within
regions, some price adjustments are made for providers designated to be in Health Professional Shortage Areas
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which make them an economically important population. Many Medicare patients have
chronic conditions that may lead them to seek regular medical care. For example, 58% have
high blood pressure, 45% have high cholesterol, 31% have heart disease, 29% have arthritis,
and 28% have diabetes (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2012). In 2012, total
healthcare spending per person over age 65 was $18,988 per year on average.18
1.2.2 Medicare Administrative Claims Data
As noted above, my primary data source is the 20% random sample of Medicare beneficiaries
(“patients”) from 1999 through 2012 from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS). I measure patient-quarter outcomes for the period from 2002 through 2011 (for
reasons I discuss in the sample selection in Section 1.2.5), which includes approximately 9.3
million patients. These administrative data provide patient demographic information (e.g.,
date of birth, sex, race, zip code of residence), and for patients in Original Medicare, their
medical claims for inpatient care, outpatient care, and physician services.19
Each claim has information on the date of service, the types and quantities of services
provided, the physician (or other provider/facility) performing the service, the diagnoses,
and the dollar values of payments by Medicare, the beneficiary, and any primary payer.20
The physician services claims list the specialty of the physician performing each service
and the Tax Identification Number (TIN) of the physician/entity to whom the payment for
each service is made.21 The specialty of the physician performing the service allows me to
identify the primary specialty of each physician over a given time period. The TIN of the
physician/entity allows me to identify each physician practice group in which physicians
share the TIN of the entity.
In addition to the Medicare claims, I use several secondary data sources for physician
characteristics, such as medical school graduation year and gender. These data sources in-
clude the American Medical Association (AMA) Physician Masterfile, the CMS Medicare
Data on Provider Practice and Specialty (MD-PPAS), the CMS National Plan and Provider
Enumeration System (NPPES), the Unique Physician Identification Number (UPIN) Direc-
tory, the UPIN Group File, and the UPIN Member File. Appendix C.3.1 provides additional
information on these datasets.
(HPSAs), cancer hospitals, children’s hospitals, rural hospitals, and sole community hospitals (Finkelstein,
Gentzkow, and Williams 2016). In ongoing work, I am constructing utilization measures that remove price
adjustments.
18Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) National Health Expen-
diture Data (https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData).
19The Medicare claims include Part A (hospital and other facility care), and Part B (medical services (e.g.,
office visits, surgeries, lab tests) and supplies). I do not include Part D (drugs) in my main analysis, since
patients have Medicare Part D only from 2006 onward.
20In the physician services claims, these variables are available at the line item level, which is more detailed
than the claim level. In the outpatient claims, these variables are available at the revenue center level, which
is more detailed than the claim level.
21My use of the “performing physician” identifiers, CMS (formerly Health Care Financing and Adminis-
tration (HCFA)) provider specialty codes, and TINs follows the literature (e.g., Pham et al. 2009).
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1.2.3 Level of Analysis
My level of observation for analysis is at the patient and quarterly calendar date level. I use
data at the quarterly level to more precisely measure the timing of patients’ PCP switches
than I could with yearly level data.22
I conduct my estimations within geographic healthcare markets, Hospital Referral Re-
gions (HRRs), defined by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.23 I assign patients to an
HRR if both any of the patient’s reported zip codes and any of their main PCP’s reported
zip codes are within the HRR over the past year.24,25 I estimate my model within each HRR
to hold fixed features of the broader healthcare market.26 The healthcare variation within a
healthcare market is relevant for policies that change PCP practice styles without changing
other features of the healthcare market or that reallocate patients across PCPs within the
patients’ geographic regions.
In my analysis, I aggregate within-market estimates by weighting them by the HRR
Original Medicare population in 2007, approximately the midpoint of the sample.27 In cases
in which I report estimates for markets by spending categories (e.g., above median, below
median), I classify markets based on the HRR-level 2007 Medicare reimbursements adjusted
for price, age, gender, and race.28
1.2.4 Primary Care Physician Definition
I define a primary care physician (PCP) as a healthcare provider with a Doctor of Medicine
(MD) or Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine (DO) degree with a specialty in family medicine,
general internal medicine, general practice, or geriatrics.29 I define a physician’s specialty as
the modal specialty associated with their claims over the past year and exclude physicians
who might temporarily be classified as PCPs but actually practice as specialist physicians.30
22I present main results with outcomes aggregated to the yearly level where applicable. In ongoing work,
I also aggregate the quarterly level data to the yearly level across my analysis for comparison.
23See the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care definitions at: http://archive.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region.
24Zip codes are occasionally reassigned to different HRRs during the sample period, so I assign each zip
code to the modal HRR (and in the case of ties, the most recent modal HRR) over the sample period.
25The past year is defined as the current and past three quarters, which are the four quarters I consider
for the main PCP assignment described in Section 1.2.4.
26A number of factors vary across HRRs, including hospitals, specialist practice styles, and regional prices.
In ongoing work, I am estimating the relationships among PCP practice styles across HRRs. These relation-
ships are identified off of patients who move across HRRs, PCPs who move across HRRs, or patients and
PCPs located near HRR borders.
27Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) “HRR Table - Beneficia-
ries 65 and older” (https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/Medicare-Geographic-Variation/GV_PUF.html).
28Source: Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare “General Atlas Rates - Medicare Spending”
(https://atlasdata.dartmouth.edu/static/general_atlas_rates#spending).
29I discuss how I identify unique physicians using Unique Provider Identification Numbers (UPINs), Na-
tional Provider Identifiers (NPIs), and names from a number of physician datasets in Appendix C.3.2.
30I exclude PCPs who are fewer than six years from medical school graduation or who become specialist
physicians within one year to exclude PCPs who further subspecialize (e.g., physicians may complete cardi-
ology fellowships after general internal medicine residency) and practice as specialist physicians rather than
as PCPs. In ongoing work, I am examining different restrictions on whether a primary care physician should
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Following the literature, I assign each patient to at most one “main PCP” per quarter
based on the PCP with whom they have the greatest number of evaluation and management
(E&M) visits in the past year (i.e., the current quarter and the previous three quarters)
(Pham et al. 2007; duGoff et al. 2018).31,32,33 Some patient-quarters will not be assigned
main PCPs. These patient-quarters consist of patients without any E&M visits with PCPs
in the past year and patients who do not meet sample restrictions for all quarters of the past
year.
I define a switch in a main PCP as change in the main PCP assignment. In the context
of switches, I refer to the main PCP a patient switches from as the “origin” PCP and the
main PCP a patient switches to as the “destination” PCP.34
An important feature of the one-year retrospective main PCP definition is that there
will be some lag in the timing of measured switches between PCPs. For example, consider
a patient who visits a PCP for an E&M visit once per quarter, stops visiting the origin
PCP in quarter t− 1, and starts visiting the destination PCP in quarter t. Using the main
PCP definition, the patient would switch from the origin PCP to the destination PCP at
quarter t + 1, since at that point the majority of visits over the current and previous three
quarters (with the most recent visit to break the tie) will switch from the origin PCP to the
destination PCP.35
I illustrate the actual empirical relationship between the main PCP assignment and
primary care utilization patterns in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.36 For clarity, I identify a subsample
of patients who are consistently matched with their origin PCPs for at least 13 quarters (12
quarters before the switch and the quarter of the switch) and then switch to and remain
matched with their destination PCPs for at least 12 quarters. I refer to this subsample as
the “consistent matches” sample. I define time zero for the PCP switch event as the last
quarter that a patient is assigned their origin PCP. Column (4) of Table 1.5 reports the
descriptive statistics for this “consistent matches” sample. I also present the primary care
utilization patterns for an “all matches” sample of switching patients, who must be matched
be excluded because they may become a specialist.
31I define a visit as a unique patient, PCP, and line item date combination.
32In my main analysis sample, which I discuss in Section 1.2.5, I require that patients have 75% of visits
in the past year with their main PCPs. When I do not impose this requirement, I break ties by selecting
the PCP with visit(s) in the most recent quarter and then by greatest utilization in the most recent quarter
with visit(s).
33In ongoing work, I am also using alternative definitions, such as more restrictive classifications of PCPs
visits (e.g., to focus on patient-PCP relationships formed through office-based visits rather than all E&M
visits).
34In my switching cost analysis, I distinguish among four types of switches: (a) switching from one PCP to
another PCP in the same practice group, (b) switching from a PCP to a PCP in a different practice group,
(c) switching from a PCP to no main PCP, and (d) from no main PCP to a PCP. I also distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary PCP switches. I define involuntary switches as cases in which the patients’ main
PCPs leave their states or leave Medicare (e.g., due to retirement) within one year before or after the main
PCP switches.
35The transition in influence from the origin PCP to the destination PCP may indeed be gradual (e.g., a
patient may be referred to a specialist by their origin main PCP but have changed to seeing their destination
PCP exclusively by the time of the specialist appointment months later). I account for these main PCP
assignment timing features in my analysis in Section 2.3.
36I restrict the sample in the figures to PCPs and patients in my analysis, specifically those in Columns
(2)-(3) of Table 1.4.
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with PCPs over the same quarters but the matches can be with any PCP. Column (3) of
Table 1.5 reports the descriptive statistics for this “all matches” sample.
Figure 1.1 plots whether a patient has any claim with any PCP, any claim with their
origin PCP, and any claim with their destination PCP on average across patient-quarters.
Figure 1.1 has several key features. First, the main PCP definition is a rolling window, and
on average patients gradually stop seeing their origin PCPs and begin seeing their destination
PCPs – even though the PCP switch may be discrete for individual patients. Second, because
the PCP switch is defined based on PCP visits, patients are mechanically more likely to have
(a) claims with their origin PCP at three quarters before their last matched quarter with
their origin PCP (event time -3) and (b) claims with their destination PCP the first quarter
they are matched with their destination PCP (event time 1).37
Figure 1.2 plots the share of claims a patient has with their origin PCP and the share
of claims a patient has with their destination PCP (conditional on having any claim with
any PCP) on average across patient-quarters. As previously shown in Figure 1.1, on average
patients gradually stop visiting their origin PCPs and begin visiting their destination PCPs.
Also, on average, even patients in the “all matches” sample have an over 60% claim share
with their origin PCPs for the 12 quarters before the switch and an over 60% claim share
with their destination PCPs for the 12 quarters after the switch. This persistently high
claim share suggests that the main PCP definition accurately identifies the PCP who has
the greatest influence on patient healthcare utilization in the sample.
The utilization patterns in these figures motivate the specification decisions in my anal-
ysis, which I discuss in Sections 1.5 and 2.3.
1.2.5 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
To construct my sample, I first restrict the observations to patient-quarters during which
patients are 65-99 years old, are enrolled in Original Medicare, and have Medicare Parts A
and B coverage in all three months.38
My definitions of a main PCP and a main PCP switch restrict the quarters that I can
use for outcomes to the period from quarter 3 of year 2000 through quarter 4 of year 2011.39
I further restrict the patient-quarters I use for outcomes to the period from quarter 1 of year
2002 through quarter 4 of year 2011 because the Medicare claims utilization data are much
more consistent in the 2002-2012 period. I refer to this restricted sample in years 2002-2011
37For example, a patient who visits a PCP in the first quarter of every calendar year is defined as switching
from their origin PCP to their destination PCP upon visiting their destination PCP for the first time (event
time 1), exactly four quarters after visiting their origin PCP for the last time (event time -3).
38I exclude Medicare Advantage patients because I do not observe Medicare Advantage claims. I also
exclude a small number of patients for whom I do not observe gender, which I use as a demographic control
in addition to age.
39First, a PCP is defined by physician specialties using the current and past three quarters of claims as
discussed in Section 1.2.4. With data starting quarter 1 of year 1999, I first have PCPs defined in quarter 4
of year 1999. Second, a patient’s main PCP is defined using the current and past three quarters of claims
as discussed in Section 1.2.4. With PCPs defined starting in quarter 4 of year 1999, I first assign main
PCPs to patients in quarter 3 of year 2000. Third, in order to check whether a patient is in the process of
switching PCPs in a given quarter, I need to observe four following quarters. This means that I can last
confirm whether a patient is in the process of switching PCPs in quarter 4 of year 2011.
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as my selected population sample.
Column (1) of Table 1.1 reports the descriptive statistics for this selected population
sample. In this sample, I identify patient-quarters that are eligible for main PCP assignment
– patients who meet the sample restrictions for the current and past three quarters – and
assign main PCPs to eligible patient-quarters.40
The patient population in Column (1) is split into Columns (2)-(4) to compare three
groups of patients. Column (2) consists of patients who are never assigned a main PCP.41
Column (3) consists of patients who are ever assigned only one main PCP. Column (4)
consists of patients who switch main PCPs at least once (i.e., they are ever assigned two or
more main PCPs). Approximately 89% of patients ever have a main PCP. Of these patients
who ever have a main PCP, approximately 62% switch PCPs at least once, so switching
PCPs is quite common.42
For my main analysis sample, I further restrict the selected population sample to patient-
quarters during which the patient is assigned a main PCP in the same HRR who they visit
for at least 75% of PCP visits over the past year. This restriction excludes 6% of patient-
quarters during which the patient is assigned a main PCP.43 For patient-quarters during the
main PCP switch, visits with both their origin PCPs and their destination PCPs may count
toward the 75% of PCP visits requirement. I require that patients visit their main PCP for
at least 75% of PCP visits to accurately attribute patient utilization to their main PCP and
avoid attenuation bias in my estimates.44 Figure B.1 illustrates the relationships among the
samples used in this dissertation.
Column (5) of Table 1.1 reports the descriptive statistics for my main analysis sample.45
Among patients in my main analysis sample, 58.5% are female and 87.4% are white. They
have an average of 2.51 main PCPs and an average age of 76.9 years. Average yearly total
utilization is about $8,200 with a standard deviation of about $16,000. Average yearly
primary care utilization is about $500 with a standard deviation about $670.
Table 1.2 reports the descriptive statistics of main PCPs associated with patient-quarters
in my main analysis sample. On average, in the 20% sample of Original Medicare patients,
PCPs are assigned 20 patients per quarter (with a standard deviation of 23), ever have 69
patients in the sample (with a standard deviation of 73), and are observed and classified as
40I allow the past three quarters to be in year 2001.
41These may be patients who (a) meet the sample restrictions for only a short period of time, (b) visit
primary care providers who I do not use in the main PCP assignment (e.g., nurse practitioners, physician
assistants), and/or (c) do not receive primary care (e.g., they are healthy, visit specialist physicians only, or
reside in facilities).
42The patients who switch PCPs have more patient-quarter observations (37.4 versus 24.7), which is
partially mechanical because they would have more opportunities to switch PCPs. On average, the patients
who switch PCPs are more female, are more white, are older, have higher total utilization, and have higher
primary care utilization. The differences in these characteristics may, in part, come from the longer panel
lengths of patients who switch PCPs.
43In ongoing work, I am examining the sensitivity of my results to this 75% of visits requirement.
44For example, the restriction excludes patients who split their visits between two PCPs, which could
occur due to institutional features (e.g., practice group policies) or patient choices (e.g., “snowbirds” who
live in colder climates in the summer and warmer climates in the winter).
45My main analysis sample in Column (5) is a subset of the patient-quarters in Columns (3) and (4) in
that Column (5) includes patients who do not switch main PCPs and patients who do switch main PCPs
but not patients who are never assigned any main PCP.
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PCPs for 6 of 10 years in the sample period. Weighted by patient-quarter observations, on
average, PCPs are assigned 51 patients per quarter (with a standard deviation of 35), ever
have 159 patients in the sample (with a standard deviation of 100), and are observed and
classified as PCPs for 9 of 10 years in the sample period.
1.2.6 Outcome Measures
My outcome measures are payment-based utilization, which I define to be total payments
in dollars from Medicare, the patient, and any primary payer (a payer who has primary
responsibility for the payment, e.g., employer group health plan, Department of Veteran
Affairs).46,47
My two main outcome measures are (a) total utilization, which is important for cost sav-
ings and policy, and (b) primary care utilization, which is the category in which PCPs likely
have the most influence. Total utilization includes all physician claims, inpatient claims, and
outpatient claims.48 Primary care utilization includes evaluation and management (E&M)
claims in which the provider is a broadly defined primary care provider, including primary
care physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants. Primary care utilization in-
cludes but is not limited to services provided by main PCPs.
I repeat my analyses with other categories of utilization – including tests, imaging, emer-
gency department visits, and inpatient hospitalizations – to examine the influence of PCPs
on other medical care and investigate potential mechanisms through which PCPs influence
total utilization. Examples of tests include bacterial cultures, blood counts, cardiovascular
stress tests, electrocardiograms, glucose, and urinalysis. Examples of imaging include car-
diac catheterization, contrast gastrointestinal, computed tomography (CT or CAT) scan,
mammogram, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), nuclear medicine, ultrasound, and X-ray.
Table 1.3 provides examples of common claims and their associated utilization. One of
the most common primary care services, a 15-minute office visit, is $35 on average. A 30-
minute office visit for a new patient is $90 on average. Longer office visits of about 40-45
minutes are about $120. Among diagnostic tests and imaging, a blood test to measure lipids
(including cholesterol) is $14, a hemoglobin A1c test to measure blood sugar is $14, and a
mammography screening is $48 on average. Appendix C.3.3 provides additional information
on the classification of claims and how I construct the outcome measures.
In additional to these payment-based utilization measures, I am including claim-based
utilization measures (e.g., counts, indicators) in ongoing work. Claim-based utilization re-
sults are relevant for interpreting the extent to which PCP influence is on the extensive
margin (e.g., whether a patient has an emergency department visit) versus the intensive
margin (e.g., whether a patient visits an emergency department that is associated with
46I include year-by-quarter fixed effects in my estimations, which accounts for inflation and other increases
healthcare prices.
47In some cases Medicare is the primary payer and there is a secondary payer (e.g., Medigap supplemental
insurance), but I do not observe the payments made by the secondary payer versus the patient or the identity
of the secondary payer.
48My measure of total utilization excludes skilled nursing facility, home health care, hospice, and durable
medical equipment claims, which is consistent with other studies (e.g., Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams
2016). In ongoing work, I am estimating a version of the analysis that includes these categories.
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greater utilization).
1.3 Descriptive Analysis
1.3.1 Descriptive Event Study Analysis
To examine the long-run and short-run changes in healthcare utilization with switches in
main PCPs, I construct descriptive event study graphs that illustrate the effects I more
precisely identify in the following sections.
First, if the variation in healthcare utilization is driven entirely by patients (e.g., general
health status, preferences) and patient time-invariant factors (e.g., patient neighborhoods),
then patients who switch main PCPs will not experience systematic changes in healthcare
utilization. If variation in healthcare utilization is driven entirely by PCP practice styles,
as measured by spending, then patients who switch main PCPs will see their healthcare
utilization change to be the same as that of the other patients at their destination PCPs.
If PCP practice styles explain part of the variation in healthcare utilization, patients who
switch from PCPs with low-spending practice styles to PCPs with high-spending practice
styles would on average experience increases in healthcare utilization, and vice versa.
Second, I consider whether switching main PCPs is associated with temporary effects on
healthcare utilization. If switching costs are positive (e.g., due to information acquisition or
temporarily lower productivity at new PCPs), the short-run increases in utilization would
most likely be concentrated after patients begin to visit their destination PCPs, which may
be either before or in the quarter of the main PCP switch (as discussed in Section 1.2.4).
As in Section 1.2.4, I define the main PCP a patient switches from as the “origin” PCP,
the main PCP a patient switches to as the “destination” PCP, and event time zero as the last
quarter that a patient is assigned their origin PCP. I use the “consistent matches” sample
of patients who are consistently matched with their origin PCPs for at least 13 quarters (12
quarters before the switch and the quarter of the switch) and then switch to and remain
matched with their destination PCPs for at least 12 quarters.
In this descriptive analysis, I classify the PCP practice style for each patient’s PCP based
on the demographics-adjusted log utilization of that PCP’s other patients (i.e., based on a
leave-out mean).49 For each patient who switches, I first identify their origin PCP’s other
patients – who I refer to as “copatients” (as with “coworkers” of workers) – in a pre-switch
period (year -1, where year 0 is the year of the switch) and their destination PCP’s copatients
in a post-switch period (year 2).50 For these copatients, I classify (a) the origin PCP based
49I adjust utilization for patient age, gender, and cohort/date by controlling for gender interacted with
second and third order polynomials in yearly age (discretized at the month level) and year-by-quarter fixed
effects. I normalize the fixed effect for quarter 1 of year 2007, approximately the midpoint of the sample,
to zero. I measure age in years at the monthly level relative to age 75 (the monthly level is consistent with
Medicare enrollment and eligibility). I set female to one for the gender indicator. I do not adjust for time-
varying patient chronic conditions because their diagnosis and coding may be correlated with PCP practice
styles. Log utilization is defined as log(1 + dollar spending), such that patients who have zero utilization in
the quarter are effectively assigned one dollar of utilization.
50Year -1 consists of quarters -7 to -4, year 0 consists of quarters -3 to 0, and year 2 consists of quarters 5
to 8.
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on the within-market quartile of utilization in the associated pre-switch period and (b) the
destination PCP based on the within-market quartile of utilization in the associated post-
switch period.51 I then assign patient switchers to 16 groups based on quartiles of copatient
utilization at the origin PCPs and at the destination PCPs.52 For the patient switchers,
I calculate the mean demographics-adjusted log quarterly utilization in the quarters before
and after the PCP switch event in each of the 16 quartile-to-quartile switching groups.
In Figures 1.3a and 1.3b, I plot the healthcare utilization profiles for patient switches for
total utilization and primary care utilization, respectively. For clarity, I plot only switches
between quartile 1 and quartile 4, and I bin quarters into years before the switch and after the
switch, such that year 0 includes a patient’s last 4 quarters with their origin PCP. I separate
a patient’s first quarter with their destination PCP from the remainder of the year to more
precisely show the utilization patterns. Figure B.2 displays additional quartile-to-quartile
switches, and Figure B.3 plots utilization profiles at quarterly intervals.
Figures 1.3a and 1.3b show several key features. I first focus on the periods outside of
the switch period (i.e., the non-shaded area of year -2 to year -1 and quarters 2-4 to year 3),
and then I discuss the patterns during the switch period (i.e., the shaded area of year 0 to
quarter 1).
First, the figures suggest that different patient quartile-to-quartile switching groups have
different utilization levels both before and after switching PCPs. The patients who switch
from quartile 4 origin PCPs to quartile 4 destination PCPs have both (a) higher utilization
before a switch than the patients who switch from quartile 4 origin PCPs to quartile 1
destination PCPs and (b) higher utilization after a switch than the patients who switch
from quartile 1 origin PCPs to quartile 4 destination PCPs. This pattern suggests that the
patients who switch from quartile 4 to quartile 4 PCPs may be systematically different (e.g.,
they have worse health status or preferences for more medical care). A similar pattern holds
for patients who switch from quartile 1 origin PCPs to quartile 1 destination PCPs.
Second, patients do change their utilization when they switch PCPs and these changes
are relatively symmetric relative to any overall trend. Changes in log utilization are ap-
proximately symmetric for patients who switch from quartile 1 origin PCPs to quartile 4
destination PCPs and for patients who switch from quartile 4 origin PCPs to quartile 1 des-
tination PCPs. The gaps between these two groups are roughly the same before the switch
and after the switch. Similarly, the gaps between these two groups and the patients who
switch from quartile 4 origin PCPs to quartile 4 destination PCPs or from quartile 1 origin
PCPs to quartile 1 destination PCPs are also roughly the same before the switch and after
the switch.
Third, healthcare utilization is fairly stable in the pre-switch period and in the post-
switch period.53 The trends across the groups are roughly parallel and there appears to be
no switching to different quartiles of PCPs based on pre-trends.
Finally, turning to the period around the time of the PCP switch (in the shaded area),
Figures 1.3a and 1.3b show both a gradual adjustment and a temporary increase in uti-
51I define the quartile of copatient utilization among patients who switch PCPs in this sample within each
market.
52I drop patient-quarter observations if the patient is only patient of their main PCP in the sample (i.e.,
if the patient has no copatients).
53There is a slight upward trend in total healthcare utilization across all quartile groups.
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lization. Utilization begins to adjust during the last year a patient is assigned their origin
PCP (year 0) toward the long-run, steady-state utilization at their destination PCP, which
reflects the retrospective main PCP assignment. Healthcare utilization is higher during the
period of the switch. This increase appears across all quartile-to-quartile switching groups.
The utilization increase appears to be temporary and very concentrated in the first quarter a
patient is assigned their destination PCP. The spike in the first quarter a patient is assigned
their destination PCP does not seem to be driven by substitution from either the previous
year (year 0) or the next three quarters in the same year (quarters 2-4). The temporarily
higher utilization is similar in magnitude across quartile-to-quartile switching groups (rel-
ative to long-run, steady-state utilization at the destination PCP), which suggests that a
single set of switch-based indicators (i.e., pre-switch leads and post-switch lags) could fairly
accurately capture the switching costs across all quartile-to-quartile switching groups.
These event study graphs illustrate the long-run and short-run effects of switching to
different PCPs that I estimate in Sections 1.5 and 2.3, respectively. The short-run effect
is a temporary increase in utilization that is concentrated during the switch period. The
long-run effect is a shift in steady-state utilization from the origin PCP’s practice style to
the destination PCP’s practice style.
The symmetry and stability of healthcare utilization in the periods outside of the switch
suggests that a simple additive model with a patient-specific component, a PCP-specific
component, vectors of switch-based indicators, and a time-varying residual component that
is uncorrelated with the other components would approximate the patterns of healthcare
utilization. Furthermore, I examine the patterns of utilization around the shaded region of
the PCP switch in additional detail in Section 2.3.
1.3.2 Log Utilization Outcome Measure
The descriptive event study analysis from Section 1.3.1 shows that a simple additive model
that includes a patient-specific component, a PCP-specific component, and vectors of switch-
based indicators would approximate the patterns of log utilization. In addition to approx-
imating the observed patterns, a log utilization outcome models utilization to be additive
in logs and multiplicative in levels for the patient-specific component and the PCP-specific
component.
From an economic perspective, I prefer a log specification because it allows PCP practice
styles to generate a larger impact in levels for sicker patients than for healthier patients.
Office-based physicians, including PCPs, often adjust their patients’ utilization by choosing
follow-up visit frequency. No definitive guidelines exist on follow-up visit frequency for
different types of patients, and the follow-up visit frequency is generally dictated as the
number of months or weeks between visits (Ganguli, Wasfy, and Ferris 2015; Javorsky,
Robinson, and Kimball 2014).54,55 Each primary care visit may be associated with other
54In the Washington Post, Ishani Ganguli, a internal medicine/primary care physician, states: “The timing
of follow-up visits...has tended to fall under the art, rather than the science, of medicine. While studies
suggest that connecting with a doctor is generally a good way to build a trusting relationship and to promote
health, we don’t really know the right frequency of visits” (Ganguli 2015).
55Van De Graff, a cardiologist, states: “Is there some textbook somewhere, some set of guidelines that tells
us how often patients with particular medical problems need routine follow-up? The answer: Nope....So,
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categories of utilization, including tests, imaging, and referrals for specialist visits. This
pattern of physician behavior generates a model that is multiplicative in levels.56,57
In addition, healthcare has a right-skewed cross-sectional distribution, and similar out-
comes of log utilization have been used with models of physician and patient behavior (e.g.,
Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams 2016). One potential disadvantage is that some patient-
quarter observations in the sample have zero utilization, such that I add one to dollar pay-
ments before the log transformation. In the long-run practice styles analysis, I present
analyses with yearly outcomes data such that all observations have non-zero utilization in
my main outcome categories of total utilization and primary care utilization.58 The log spec-
ification implicitly gives more weight to the lower-utilization part of the distribution than a
specification that is additive in levels would.59
1.4 Model
1.4.1 Econometric Model
Based on the utilization patterns in the descriptive analysis, I use an econometric framework
that combines (a) a two-way fixed effects model to capture time-invariant patient charac-
teristics and PCP practice styles with (b) an event study model to capture PCP switching
utilization patterns. I draw upon the methodology from two-way fixed effects models in
the firm-worker literature (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999; Abowd, Creecy, and
Kramarz 2002; Card, Heining, and Kline 2013; Card, Cardoso, Heining, and Kline 2018).
In healthcare contexts, Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams (2016) also use a two-way
fixed effects model to separate components of utilization attributable to patient factors versus
supply-side factors, and they show that it can be derived from a micro-founded model of
patient demand and physician supply. In Appendix C.1, I extend their micro-founded model
with a parameter that explicitly captures the effect of switching PCPs on utilization and
derive my econometric model under the same main assumptions.
The dataset I construct includes an observation for each patient i and quarter t. The
function j (i, t) gives the identity of the unique main PCP of patient i in quarter t. I assume
routine follow-up will most likely fall somewhere between ’less often than weekly’ and ’at least once yearly or
more frequently.’ But within those limits, as a doctor I’m pretty much free to choose whatever I like....Sadly,
I’ve known doctors who use the unquestioning obedience of some patients to their own financial advan-
tage. Does a stable patient really need to come in for visits every two months or need a stress test and
echocardiogram every six?” (Van De Graaff 2011).
56For example, suppose a low-utilization PCP asks patients to visit every 12 months, and a high-utilization
PCP ask patients to visit every 6 months. Suppose also that a healthy patient spends $100 per visit and a
sick patient spends $300 per visit (e.g., due to billing codes for higher complexity, associated tests/imaging,
associated specialist visits). The healthy patient would have either $100 or $200 of yearly utilization, whereas
the sick patient would have either $300 or $600 of yearly utilization.
57What the log utilization specification does not accurately capture is if PCPs vary based on some fixed
utilization amount that is nearly the same across patients (e.g., if high-utilization PCPs always do preventive
care for all patients but low-utilization PCPs never do).
58Fewer than 1% of observations have negative dollar payments due to Medicare billing procedures, and I
recode these values to be log of zero dollar payments plus one.
59In ongoing work, I am using other outcome measures without this log specification, such as counts and
indicators for claim-based utilization measures.
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that the log utilization outcome yit of patient i in quarter t is the sum of a patient component
αi, a PCP component γj(i,t), an index of time-varying observable characteristics xitβ, effects
of switching PCPs ΣgΣkθg,kDg,kit (where D
g,k
it are indicators for k time periods relative to
PCP switches of type g, which I discuss below), and an error component εit:





θg,kDg,kit + εit. (1.1)
I interpret αi as the healthcare patient i would receive at all PCPs, which includes patient
i’s time-invariant health status and preferences as well as other time-invariant factors, such as
patient i’s neighborhood. I interpret physician γj(i,t) as PCP j’s practice style, the healthcare
PCP j would choose for all patients. This term includes the general frequency at which the
PCP asks patients to return for follow-up visits and the general propensity of the PCP to
refer patients to specialists rather than attempting to diagnose and treat them directly. I
include in xit an unrestricted set of year-by-quarter indicators as well as quadratic and cubic
terms in age interacted with gender.60
To capture temporary utilization patterns associated with PCP switches, I include indi-
cators Dg,kit for whether patient has a specific type of switch g for any k ∈ [−8, 12] quarters
relative to event time k = 0, the last quarter a patient is assigned a given main PCP. I define
the leads to be whether the patient switches away from their current main PCP and the lags
to be whether the patient switched to their current main PCP.61 I allow for four switch types
g to capture utilization patterns that may vary across the different types of switches. The
four switch types g are: (a) between two main PCPs in the same physician practice group,
(b) between two main PCPs in different physician practice groups, (c) from no main PCP
to a main PCP, and (d) from a main PCP to no main PCP.62,63
The PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects are only separately identified within a
“connected set” of PCPs and patients who are linked by patients who switch PCPs (Abowd,
Creecy, and Kramarz 2002). In my estimation, I restrict my analysis to the largest connected
set within each market, and I discuss the sample in Section 1.5.1. The identification also
requires normalization, and I normalize the mean of PCP fixed effects and mean of patient
fixed effects in each market to zero.
60I measure age in years at the monthly level relative to age 75 (the monthly level is consistent with
Medicare enrollment and eligibility). I set female to one for the gender indicator. The year-by-quarter
indicators control for market-level factors, which are different across dates/cohorts, and I normalize their
mean to zero. See Card, Cardoso, Heining, and Kline (2018) for a discussion of normalizations.
61As an alternative specification, I could include leads and lags for additional switches (e.g., leads for
whether a patient switches away from their next main PCP, lags for whether a patient switched to their
previous main PCP).
62I define PCPs to be in the same physician practice group if they have a common tax number with up
to a one-year gap relative to the PCP switch date. The one-year gap captures cases in which a PCP leaves
a practice group and another (potentially replacement) PCP subsequently, but not immediately, joins the
practice group.
63Specifically, Dg,kit consists of 63 indicators, three for each of the 21 event time quarters k ∈ [−8, 12].
Each of the two types of switches between PCPs has indicators for 21 event time quarters k ∈ [−8, 12]. The
switch from a PCP to no PCP has indicators for 9 event time quarters k ∈ [−8, 0]. The switch from no PCP
to a PCP has indicators for 12 event time quarters k ∈ [1, 12].
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1.4.2 Assumptions on the Physician Switching Process
For my estimation to identify the parameters of interest as defined, I assume that the error
term εit has E [εit|, i, t, xit] = 0, has V ar [εit|i, t, xit] < ∞, and is orthogonal to other terms
in the model as described in Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002).64 There are three forms
of “endogenous” switching that would violate these assumptions and cause biases in my
approach.
The first type would be patient sorting based on some idiosyncratic match of physician
and patients. This form of sorting could be generated by the models from Roy (1951) and
Chandra and Staiger (2007). I check for this sorting in two ways. First if patients select PCPs
based on this match component, then I would expect the increases in utilization for patients
who move from one PCP to another PCP to be different from the decreases in utilization for
patients who move in the opposite direction. Under my assumptions, the expected utilization
changes between pairs of PCPs, (γj − γj′) and (γj′ − γj), would be symmetric. As described
in Section 1.3.1, the increase in average utilization for patients switching from quartile 1
PCPs to quartile 4 PCPs is roughly equal to the decrease in average utilization for patients
switching in the opposite direction. Also, aside from the switch period, the average utilization
among patients who switch from quartile 4 PCPs to other quartile 4 PCPs remains roughly
constant, and the average utilization among patients who switch from quartile 1 PCPs to
other quartile 1 PCPs remains roughly constant.65 Second if match effects are important,
a fully saturated model that includes a separate indicator for each matched patient-PCP
pair should fit the data much better than the additively separable model in Equation 1.1.
The model with the patient-PCP matches yields slightly higher R-squared values, but the
increases are small. I present the results on the fit of the model in Section 1.6.
The second type of endogenous switching would be if the drift in the expected utilization
a patient would have at all PCPs predicts PCP-to-PCP switches. This form of sorting would
occur if a patient who receives a health shock with persistent effects is systematically more
likely to switch to a PCP with a high-spending practice style or to a PCP with a low-spending
PCP practice style. This type of behavior could be patient driven (e.g., if a patient who
has declining health seeks a PCP who has greater appointment availability and generally
allows for more frequent follow-up visits) or PCP-driven (e.g., if a PCP refers a patient with
a new diagnosis to another PCP who may have more expertise in the disease). Though these
switches may occur idiosyncratically for individual matched patient-PCP pairs, there is no
evidence of systematic switching based on the drift in expected utilization. The figures do
not exhibit systematic trends in the healthcare utilization prior to the year of the switch
(years -1 and -2) or after the switch (years 2 and 3) across patients who make different
quartile-to-quartile switches. Also, this type of switching might be more likely to occur
for patients who receive negative health shocks (e.g., who may choose to switch to higher-
spending PCPs), but the symmetry in the transitions of patients between quartile 1 PCPs
and quartile 4 PCPs suggests that this type of switching would be limited.
The third type of endogenous switching would be if fluctuations in the transitory error
(e.g., period-specific health shocks) are associated with switching to systematically high-
64See Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) for a detailed discussion of the assumptions.
65There is some narrowing of the distribution in total utilization, but not for primary care utilization,
which would be easier for patients to sort on than total utilization.
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spending PCPs or low-spending PCPs. I do not observe pre-trends or post-trends outside
the period of the switch. In my estimation of the variance of PCP fixed effects, which I
discuss further in Section 1.5, I exclude periods during the switch to accurately estimate the
variance of PCP effects on long-run, steady-state utilization.
1.5 Methodology: Physician Practice Styles
1.5.1 Variance of Physician Fixed Effects and Estimation
In the first part of my analysis, I estimate the contribution of differences in individual
PCP practice styles, as measured by spending, to variation in healthcare utilization within
markets. I decompose the variance of healthcare utilization within each of the 306 Hospital
Referral Region (HRR) markets.
I return to my econometric model from Section 1.4.1 with patient i, quarter t, and main
PCP j (i, t). My main parameter of interest is the variance of the PCP fixed effects γj(i,t) in
the econometric model





θg,kDg,kit + εit (1.2)
where yit is the log utilization outcome, αi are patient fixed effects, γj(i,t) are main PCP
fixed effects, xit are controls, and Dg,kit are indicators for time relative to PCP switches as
discussed in Section 1.4.1.66
My goal is to estimate the contribution of differences in individual PCP practice styles, as
measured by spending, to variation in a demographics-adjusted measure of patient long-run,
steady-state utilization. Patient gender, patient age, and market-level factors drive much of
healthcare utilization but are essentially predetermined for individual PCPs and patients, so
I exclude the contributions of these factors from healthcare variation. Similarly, I exclude the
temporary effects of switching PCPs from healthcare variation given the utilization patterns
discussed in Section 1.3.1.
In my estimation, I partial out the effects of the controls xit and the effects of the switching
indicators Dg,kit estimated from a first-stage ordinary least squares regression of Equation 1.2.
Specifically, I calculate an adjusted measure of utilization






where βˆ and θˆg,k are estimated from the first-stage ordinary least squares regression of
Equation 1.2.67 The intuition is that I adjust utilization for these factors in a way that is
66Controls xit include an unrestricted set of year-by-quarter indicators as well as quadratic and cubic
terms in age interacted with gender.
67Equation 1.2 could be rewritten and estimated in a second-stage ordinary least squares regression y˜it =
αi+γj(i,t)+εit for a standard variance decomposition. When estimated in ordinary least squares regressions,
the estimated fixed effects αˆi and γˆj(i,t) in this equation are identical to those estimated from Equation
1.2. Note that this setup does not require the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem because all of the regressors
(including patient fixed effects αi and PCP fixed effects γj(i,t)) are in the first-stage regression of Equation
1.2.
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consistent with the econometric model, including the patient fixed effects αi and the PCP
fixed effects γj(i,t). I then decompose the variance of the adjusted measure of utilization as








+ V ar (εit) . (1.4)




based on the variance decomposition in
Equation 1.4, I cannot use the standard ordinary least squares approach. A key empirical
challenge is that sampling errors lead to biases in variance decompositions (Andrews et al.
2008).68 The biases are larger in datasets in which there are fewer movers, or switchers,
such that this bias is also known as “limited mobility bias” (Andrews et al. 2008).69 In
the primary care setting, and particularly in a dataset that includes only a 20% sample
of Original Medicare patients, there are few patient switchers between PCPs. Standard
ordinary least squares estimation would lead to a positive bias in the variance of PCP fixed
effects, a positive bias in the variance of patient fixed effects, and a negative bias in the
covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects.
I apply a recently available econometric method by Kline, Saggio, and Sølvsten (2018)
that constructs unbiased estimators of variance and covariance. The estimators allow for
heteroskedastic errors, and the estimation procedure allows for autocorrelation within a
patient-PCP match by leaving out matched patient-PCP pairs.70
1.5.2 Estimation Outcome Measures and Samples
In my estimation, I use two sets of outcome measures. First, I estimate the variance of PCP
fixed effects in yearly utilization – defined as utilization over the past year – for results that
are directly interpretable and comparable to existing literature.71 My outcome measure is,
therefore, a rolling sum across patient-quarter observations. The intuition in interpreting
this specification is that it is similar to one in which I would use patient-year observations
and weight the observations by the number of quarters each patient is assigned each main
PCP during the year, except that in my specification with patient-quarter observations, the
utilization and the controls (e.g., patient age, cohort/date) are more precisely measured.
For my estimation sample, I omit patient-quarters during the main PCP switches based
on the utilization patterns discussed in Section 1.2.4. Specifically, I omit any observation
68Sampling errors in the estimated PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects leads to positive biases in
the variance of PCP fixed effects and in the variance of patient fixed effects. The correlation in the sampling
errors in the estimated PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects often leads to a negative bias in the
covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects.
69Andrews et al. (2008) offer a correction that would require an assumption of normality in the sampling
distribution of the estimated variance of PCP effects, but my data likely have non-normality in the sampling
distribution of the estimated variance of PCP effects due to few movers in my connected set of PCPs and
patients (Kline, Saggio, and Sølvsten 2018).
70Kline, Saggio, and Sølvsten (2018) also provide a method to compute standard errors on the variance and
covariance estimates. Specifically, I compute homoskedastic standard errors (which I can compute in all of
my markets), with a modification to the Kline, Saggio, and Sølvsten (2018) estimation procedure written by
Saggio (2018) that computes heteroskedastic standard errors (which I cannot compute in all of my markets
using the current estimation procedure).
71I use yearly utilization such that yit is defined as the log of sum of the current quarter of utilization, the
previous three quarters of utilization, and one.
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that could include part of a switch period, which consists of event times -3 to 0 (the last
four quarters with the origin PCP) and event time 1 (the first quarter with the destination
PCP), in its outcome measure. In this analysis with yearly utilization, I omit eight quarters
of outcomes (i.e., event times -3 to +4, where 0 is defined as the last quarter a patient is
assigned their origin PCP, such that the outcome at event time +5 is the sum of utilization
from event time +2 to event time +5). I also omit patient-quarter observations that are not
followed by four quarters in the sample because patients might have switched main PCPs if
their data were not censored.72
I exclude the switch period from the variance decomposition because patients are likely
influenced by both their origin PCP and their destination PCP, on average, during the switch.
Assignment to one PCP or another would lead to measurement error and attenuation bias
in the estimates of the variance of PCP fixed effects.73
My main PCP definition and omission of switch period observations affect the utilization
that I attribute to PCPs. I do not attribute utilization associated with the onset of Medicare
eligibility at age 65 (as described in Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2009) to PCPs because a
patient is not assigned a main PCP until their fourth quarter of Medicare eligibility. I also do
not attribute end-of-life utilization to PCPs because I omit the last four quarters of patient
lives.74
My estimation allows for the mechanical autocorrelation in my outcome measure. The
estimation procedure I use by Kline, Saggio, and Sølvsten (2018) accounts for any autocorre-
lation within a matched patient-PCP pair, so I can allow for this mechanical autocorrelation
in outcomes within patient-PCP pairs. I omit more than four patient-quarter observations
between matched patient-PCP pairs, so there is no mechanical autocorrelation in outcomes
between patient-PCP pairs.
Column (4) of Table 1.4 reports the descriptive statistics for this sample.75 Figure B.1
illustrates the relationship of this sample to others used in this dissertation. Compared with
the main analysis sample, the patients in my connected set have lower average yearly total
utilization of about $5,000 (versus $8,200) with a standard deviation about $9,600 (versus
$16,000) and lower average primary care utilization of about $380 (versus $500) with a
standard deviation of about $390 (versus $670).
Second, for simplicity and for consistency with my estimation of switching costs in Chap-
ter 2, I estimate the variance of PCP fixed effects with contemporaneous quarterly utilization
outcome measures.76 I describe the sample and the results in Appendix C.2.
72For example, patients who plan to switch to Medicare Advantage might be in the process of switching
to PCPs in the provider networks of their new Medicare Advantage plans.
73The omission of these observations in which a patient cannot be fully attributed to a PCP is consistent
with similar variance decompositions in previous literature (e.g., Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams (2016),
who omit the year of the move in patient migration).
74Patients might have switched PCPs in the absence of death. In an alternative specification, I could allow
for these periods and assume the patients do not switch when their data are censored.
75The estimation procedure further restricts the sample to the largest connected set within each market
that remains connected when each patient-PCP pair is separately omitted from the sample, and this sample
is referred to as the “leave-out” connected sets sample. Column (3) of Table A.1 reports the descriptive
statistics for this sample. This leave-out connected sets sample is very similar to the full connected sets
estimation sample in Column (2) of Table A.1 and Column (4) of Table 1.4.
76I use quarterly utilization such that yit is defined as the log of sum of the current quarter of utilization
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1.6 Results: Physician Practice Styles
Table 1.6 reports the variance decomposition results for yearly total utilization, and Table
1.7 reports the results for yearly primary care utilization. In both Tables 1.6 and 1.7, Column
(3) reports the results for all 306 hospital referral region (HRR) markets weighted by their
Original Medicare population.77,78 The mean variance of PCP fixed effects is 2.4% of the
total variance in total utilization, and the mean variance of PCP fixed effects is 12.6% of the
total variance in primary care utilization.
Figure 1.4 plots the distribution of the estimated variances across markets. Some of the
estimated variances of PCP fixed effects are negative and imprecisely estimated, and these
are concentrated among smaller markets.79
In both Tables 1.6 and 1.7, Columns (4) and (5) report the estimates for markets with
above median spending and below median spending, respectively. Column (1) reports the
results for Miami, which is a high-spending market, and Column (2) reports the results for
Minneapolis, which is a low-spending market.80
Due to the leave-out estimation that leaves out patient-PCP matches, the variance of
patient fixed effects cannot be estimated for non-switchers.81 To obtain estimates of the
variance of patient fixed effects, I restrict the estimation to patients who switch PCPs at
least once. Table A.7 reports the total utilization results for switchers, and Table A.8 reports
the primary care utilization results for switchers. Among this switchers subsample, the mean
variance of patient fixed effects is 28.4% of the total variance in total utilization, and the
mean variance of patient fixed effects is 11.1% of the total variance in primary care utilization.
Bringing these results together, differences in PCP practice styles, as measured by spend-
ing, explain a small and significant 2.4% of total utilization variation. Differences across
time-invariant patient factors contribute about 11 times more than differences in PCP prac-
tice styles to variance in total utilization. As one would expect, PCPs have substantially
greater influence in primary care utilization. Differences in PCP practice styles explain
12.6% of primary care utilization variation. Differences across time-invariant patient factors
explain slightly less than differences in PCP practice styles do in primary care.
A feature of my specification is that it does not capture time-varying patient character-
istics. I do not include time-varying patient chronic conditions in my main analysis because
their diagnosis and coding may be correlated with PCP practice styles. As a result, the con-
tribution of differences across patients to variation in healthcare that I estimate is a lower
bound.82
and one.
77I compute the weighted means of the point estimates, means, and counts. I compute the standard errors
that correspond to the weighted point estimates.
78Results are similar with an unweighted average across HRRs, and I present these estimates in Table A.6.
79Negative point estimates of the variance in PCP fixed effects occur for 71 of 306 markets in total
utilization and for 12 of 306 markets in primary care utilization.
80The U.S. mean price, age, sex, and race-adjusted total Medicare reimbursements per beneficiary was
$8,507 in 2007. Miami ranked highest in spending with $14,611, and Minneapolis ranked 259th of 306 HRRs
in spending with $6,992.
81For non-switchers, all observations of a patient are left out when the estimation procedure leaves out its
only patient-PCP match.
82In ongoing analysis, I am examining the contribution of time-varying patient chronic conditions.
CHAPTER 1. PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN PRACTICE STYLES 22
I compare the total utilization and primary care utilization results to other categories
of healthcare utilization, including tests and imaging, which PCPs often use for diagnosis,
monitoring of chronic conditions, and preventive care. Table 1.8 reports the results for tests
utilization and imaging utilization. The mean variance of PCP fixed effects is 5.9% of the
total variance in tests utilization, and the mean variance of PCP fixed effects is 2.7% of the
total variance in imaging utilization. Differences in PCP practice styles explain less of the
variance in tests utilization (e.g., for diagnosis or monitoring of blood sugar or cholesterol)
than in primary care utilization but more than in total utilization or in imaging utilization.
Differences in PCP practice styles explain about the same amount of the variation in imaging
utilization as they do in total utilization. I also report results for emergency department and
hospital inpatient utilization in Table 1.9. The mean variance of PCP fixed effects is 1.6%
of the total variance in emergency department utilization, and the mean variance of PCP
fixed effects is 2.1% of the total variance in hospital inpatient utilization.
1.7 Discussion
1.7.1 Significance and Limitations
This chapter provides some of the first evidence on the influence of individual PCPs on
healthcare utilization, while accounting for unobservable patient characteristics, in a large
U.S. population. I first show that utilization patterns generated by PCP practice styles,
patient characteristics, and patients switching PCPs can generally be explained in an event
study framework with PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects. In this model, I estimate
the unbiased variance of PCP fixed effects within each of the 306 hospital referral region
(HRR) markets. I find that differences in PCP practice styles, as measured by spending,
explain 2.4% of the variation in total utilization and 12.6% of the variation in primary care
utilization within healthcare markets.
This study has a few main limitations. First, I estimate the contribution of only two
components of health production to healthcare utilization: PCPs and patients. The research
design and econometric model do not enable me to separate out other supply-side factors
– such as specialist physicians and hospitals – that influence healthcare utilization through
PCPs, patients, and other channels.
Second, my sample is limited by the research design and methodology. My definitions
of a main PCP and a main PCP switch affect the utilization that I attribute to PCPs. I
do not attribute utilization associated with the onset of Medicare eligibility at age 65 to
PCPs because patient are not assigned main PCPs until their fourth quarter of Medicare
eligibility. I also do not attribute end-of-life utilization to PCPs because I omit the last four
quarters of patients’ lives. The requirement for connected sets further limits the sample of
patient-quarters in the estimation samples.
Third, my main aggregate results likely mask heterogeneity both across PCPs and across
patients. Some groups of PCPs and some groups of patients may be more influential than
others in determining their healthcare utilization. For example, patients who are most
familiar with the healthcare system (e.g., current and former healthcare professionals) likely
exert greater influence on their healthcare utilization.
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1.7.2 Policy Implications
My findings are relevant for policies that seek to alter physician practice styles for the pur-
poses of increasing efficiency or reducing costs. PCPs have important roles as coordinators
and gatekeepers of care in Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), and Point of Service (POS) health plans. PCPs are a central com-
ponent of Medicare ACO programs.83 Medicare has several ACO programs and started the
Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) in Original Medicare, the context of my study,
in April 2012. The initial savings in Medicare ACOs, even not accounting for shared-savings
bonuses paid, have been modest or insignificant (McWilliams et al. 2015; McWilliams et al.
2016). My findings indicate that differences in PCP practice styles explain a small, though
significant, 2.4% of within-market healthcare variation, so the findings of modest savings in
Medicare ACOs are not surprising. If MSSP or other ACOs could change PCPs at the 60th
percentile of spending to become like PCPs at the 40th percentile of spending the savings
would be only $231 per year for a representative patient, based on counterfactual calcula-
tions in Chapter 2. In practice, altering PCP practices styles by an amount equivalent to
the difference across 20% of the distribution may be challenging in the short run. Physician
training, institutional features, and other characteristics determine PCP practice styles, so
policymakers would need to assess to what degree policies could feasibly alter PCP practice
styles for substantial cost savings.
1.7.3 Conclusion
This chapter examines one dimension of PCP practice styles – utilization as measured by
spending – and finds that differences across PCPs contributes to 2.4% of the variation in
total healthcare utilization within markets. Given that I find significant variation across
PCPs, understanding drivers of this variation would be important for PCP-targeted policies.
For example, if less productive PCPs incur greater utilization, then forcing high-spending
PCPs to reduce utilization could have adverse consequences on patient health outcomes. On
the other hand, if productivity is the same across PCPs and some PCPs are just operating
on the “flat of the curve” then incentivizing high-spending PCPs to reduce utilization could
potentially lead to cost savings without adverse consequences. Future research could study
variation in PCP practice styles across additional dimensions, such as productivity, expertise,
and discretion, to develop informed policy recommendations.
83In Medicare ACOs, “primary care physicians are encouraged to join together with other providers to take
responsibility for the full continuum of their primary care patients’ care. They must commit to reporting com-
prehensive measures of the quality and – eventually – outcomes of care. If they are able to improve quality and
thereby reduce costs, they will receive a share of the savings achieved.” Source: Dartmouth Atlas of Health
Care “Accountable Care” webpage (http://archive.dartmouthatlas.org/keyissues/issue.aspx?con=2943).
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics: Patient Selected Population and Main Analysis Samples
Selected Selected Population by Any Switch Main Analysis
Pop. No PCP No Switch Switch(es) Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Patients (millions) 9.32 1.06 3.12 5.15 7.51
Female (%) 56.7 46.3 55.3 59.6 58.5
White (%) 86.3 79.2 86.5 87.6 87.4
# main PCPs ever (mean) 2.14 0 1 3.28 2.51
# quarters in sample (mean) 30.5 14.0 24.7 37.4 33.9
B. Patient-Qtrs. (millions) 210.3 10.8 54.9 144.6 133.5
Age (years, mean) 75.9 71.6 74.7 76.5 76.9
Main PCP eligible (%) 93.5 79.7 90.6 95.6 100.0
Assigned main PCP (%) 72.1 0.0 69.4 78.5 100.0
Quarterly Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 1,927 647 1,546 2,167 2,247
Total util. std. dev. ($) 6,741 4,612 6,134 7,070 7,032
Any total util. (%) 81.9 36.4 80.5 85.8 90.6
Primary care util. mean ($) 106 10 93 118 136
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 259 127 214 279 281
Any primary care util. (%) 53.9 4.1 55.0 57.1 69.9
Past Year Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 6,872 1,938 5,361 7,815 8,151
Total util. std. dev. ($) 15,352 8,972 13,536 16,237 16,122
Any total util. (%) 93.7 52.4 93.3 96.9 100.0
Primary care util. mean ($) 381 24 333 426 500
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 627 227 519 673 666
Any primary care util. (%) 78.1 7.4 77.3 83.7 100.0
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for the selected population sample and the main
analysis sample described in Section 1.2.5. In Column (1), the selected population sample is re-
stricted to (a) years 2002-2011 and (b) patient-quarters during which patients are 65-99 years old
and are enrolled in traditional fee-for-service (Original) Medicare Parts A and B coverage in all
three months. Columns (2)-(4) split the patients in Column (1). Column (2) consists of patients
who are never assigned a main primary care physician (PCP). Column (3) consists of patients who
are ever assigned only one main PCP. Column (4) consists of patients who are ever assigned to two
or more PCPs. In Column (5), the main analysis sample is restricted to patient-quarters during
which the patient is assigned a main PCP in the same market who they visit for at least 75% of PCP
visits over the past year. For patient-quarters during main PCP switches, both origin PCPs and
destination PCPs count toward the 75% of PCP visits requirement. Column (5) is a subsample of
patient-quarters in Columns (3) and (4). Patients are eligible for main PCP assignment if they meet
the selected population sample restrictions for the current and past three quarters. The reported
percentages of patient-quarters with assigned main PCPs are calculated among those eligible for
main PCP assignment.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics: Primary Care Physicians (PCPs) of Main Analysis Sample
Unweighted Patient-Quarter Weighted
Mean / SD Obs. (thousands) Mean / SD Obs. (millions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Patients/Quarter 20 229.2 51 133.5
(23) (35)
# Patients Ever 69 229.2 159 133.5
(73) (100)
# Patient-Quarters 582 229.2 1787 133.5
(837) (1316)
# Quarters 24 229.2 36 133.5
(14.2) (7.4)
Med School Grad Year 1986 226.7 1983 133.4
(12.35) (10.26)
Gender Female (%) 31.2 210.8 18.4 131.1
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of the main primary care physicians (PCPs) of the
patients in the main analysis sample (see Table 1.1, Column (5)). Columns (1) and (2) report
the unweighted statistics for PCPs with standard deviations in parentheses. Columns (3) and (4)
report the patient-quarter weighted statistics for PCPs with standard deviations in parentheses.
Main PCPs are defined in Section 1.2.4.
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Table 1.3: Utilization Outcome Measure Examples
Mean ($) Freq.(thousands) HCPCS
(1) (2) (3)
A. Evaluation and Management Outpatient Visits
Established patient visit (10 mins) 35.44 681 99212
Established patient visit (15 mins) 58.05 3323 99213
Established patient visit (40 mins) 120.75 243 99215
New patient visit (20 mins) 59.98 72 99202
New patient visit (30 mins) 90.01 148 99203
New patient visit (45 mins) 137.79 91 99204
Consultation (40 mins) 119.95 153 99243
Consultation (60 mins) 177.32 183 99244
B. Tests
Blood lipids test (lipid panel) 14.21 642 80061
Hemoglobin A1c test 13.53 342 83036
C. Imaging
Mammography (bilateral) 47.83 135 77057
Notes: This table reports mean utilization in dollars and frequency for several common physician
services for patients in the main analysis sample (see Table 1.1, Column (5)) in quarter 1 of year
2007, approximately the midpoint of the sample. Column (1) reports the utilization in dollars
of spending, which is the sum of Medicare payments, patient payments, and any primary payer
payments, as defined in Section 1.2.6. Column (2) reports the frequency among patients. Column
(3) reports the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) or Current Procedural
Terminology (CPT) code that defines each service.
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Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics: Connected Sets Samples
Connected Sets Samples
Main Analysis Quarterly Outcome Yearly Outcome
Sample w/o Switch w/ Switch w/o Switch
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Patients (millions) 7.51 5.18 4.46
Female (%) 58.5 59.9 60.4
White (%) 87.4 88.9 89.4
# main PCPs ever (mean) 2.51 2.56 2.53
# quarters in sample (mean) 33.9 38.4 40.0
B. Patient-Qtrs. (millions) 133.5 73.4 81.3 61.6
Age (years, mean) 76.9 76.6 76.7 77.1
Quarterly Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 2,247 1,297 1,313 1,292
Total util. std. dev. ($) 7,032 4,050 4,091 3,999
Any total util. (%) 90.6 90.1 90.0 90.6
Primary care util. mean ($) 136 96 95 97
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 281 146 147 144
Any primary care util. (%) 69.9 69.8 69.1 70.7
Past Year Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 8,151 5,107 5,133 5,032
Total util. std. dev. ($) 16,122 9,879 9,939 9,649
Primary care util. mean ($) 500 379 375 378
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 666 399 398 392
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for the connected sets samples (sets of patients
and PCPs linked by patients who switch PCPs), which I use for analysis in Sections 1.5 and
2.3. Column (1) reports the main analysis sample from Column (5) of Table 1.1. Columns (2)
and (4) report the patient-quarter samples that omit the quarters during PCP switches, which I
use for analysis in Section 1.5. Column (3) reports the patient-quarter samples that may include
the quarters during PCP switches, which I use for analysis in Section 2.3. The patient-quarter
observations in Column (2) are a subset of those Column (3), and the patients are identical. The
patients and patient-quarter observations in Column (4) are subsets of those in Column (2).
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Table 1.5: Descriptive Statistics: Switchers Balanced Panel Around PCP Switch
Connected Sets Switchers Balanced Panel
Main Analysis Yearly Outcome All Consistent
Sample w/o Switch Matches Matches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Patients (thousands) 7,512 4,464 540 156
Female (%) 58.5 60.4 65.2 66.7
White (%) 87.4 89.4 90.4 90.2
# main PCPs ever (mean) 2.51 2.53 3.59 2.79
# quarters in sample (mean) 33.9 40.0 49.2 50.4
B. Patient-Qtrs. (millions) 133.52 61.63 13.53 3.77
Age (years, mean) 76.9 77.1 77.6 78.2
Quarterly Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 2,247 1,292 1,695 1,608
Total util. std. dev. ($) 7,032 3,999 5,092 4,527
Any total util. (%) 90.6 90.6 91.2 94.6
Primary care util. mean ($) 136 97 116 126
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 281 144 203 180
Any primary care util. (%) 69.9 70.7 69.6 79.1
Past Year Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 8,151 5,032 6,502 6,227
Total util. std. dev. ($) 16,122 9,649 11,982 10,746
Primary care util. mean ($) 500 378 444 489
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 666 392 519 496
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for a balanced panel of patients who switch PCPs
that includes 12 quarters before the switch and 12 quarters after the switch, where event time zero
for the switch is defined as the last quarter a PCP is assigned to a patient. Column (1) includes
the main analysis sample from Column (5) of Table 1.1. Column (2) includes the connected sets
sample from Column (4) of Table 1.4, which I use for analysis in Section 1.5. Columns (3) and (4)
include the switchers balanced panel, which I restrict to the connected sets sample for quarterly
utilization in Column (2) of Table 1.4. Column (3) includes all patient-PCP matches, i.e., patients
who have any assigned main PCP in every quarter for 12 quarters before the switch through 12
quarters after the switch. Column (4) includes only consistent patient-PCP matches, which I define
as patients who are consistently matched with their origin PCPs for 12 quarters before the switch
and consistently matched with their destination PCPs for 12 quarters after the switch. Column (4)
is a subset of Column (3). The number of patient-quarter observations is not exactly 25 times the
number of patients because (a) a patient can appear in the sample for more than one switch and
(b) a patient-quarter observation can appear in the post-period for one switch and in the pre-period
for another switch.
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Table 1.6: Practice Styles Results: Variance in Yearly Total Utilization









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of within-market
estimations
1 1 306 153 153
A. Variance and Covariance Estimates (market/multi-market mean, SE in parentheses)
Variance of PCP FEs 0.217 2.200 2.449 2.617 2.212
as % share of total variance (1.488) (2.198) (0.136) (0.131) (0.271)
Cov. of patient & PCP FEs 2.681 -0.007 0.011 0.156 -0.193
as % share of total variance (1.611) (2.103) (0.134) (0.129) (0.266)
B. Other Statistics & Results (market or multi-market mean)
# of PCP fixed effects 1,011 1,261 726 867 526
# of patient-qtr. obs. 239,060 345,977 361,421 433,553 259,626
Mean of log util. 8.232 7.422 7.735 7.791 7.655
Std. dev. of log util. 1.219 1.318 1.270 1.271 1.269
Var. of log util. 1.486 1.737 1.616 1.618 1.614
Var. of PCP FEs 0.003 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.036
Std. dev. of PCP FEs 0.057 0.195 0.180 0.189 0.168
Notes: This table reports the results of the 306 within-market estimations of (a) the variance of
primary care physician (PCP) fixed effects (FEs) and (b) the covariance of the PCP fixed effects
and the patient fixed effects in a two-way fixed effects model. The estimation uses patient-quarter
level observations in the leave-out patient-PCP match procedure described in Section 1.5.1. The
outcome variable is the log of yearly total utilization in the past year. Column (1) reports the results
for Miami (a high-spending market), and Column (2) reports the results for Minneapolis (a low-
spending market). Column (3) reports the estimates for all 306 markets weighted by the number of
Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market. Columns (4)-(5) report the weighted estimates of
the above median and below median markets by spending. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A report
estimates of the shares of utilization that are the variance of PCP fixed effects and the covariance of
PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects along with their corresponding standard errors (SEs). In
Columns (3)-(5) of Panel A, the PCP fixed effects share and the covariance of PCP fixed effects and
patient fixed effects share are the weighted means of the corresponding estimates, and the standard
errors are computed accordingly. The standard deviation of the PCP fixed effects is imputed to
be zero in markets where the point estimate of the variance of PCP fixed effects is negative. The
sample is the connected set for yearly utilization that omits the switch period in Column (4) of
Table 1.4 that remains connected when each patient-PCP pair is excluded. Markets are hospital
referral regions (HRRs).
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Table 1.7: Practice Styles Results: Variance in Yearly Primary Care Utilization









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of within-market
estimations
1 1 306 153 153
A. Variance and Covariance Estimates (market/multi-market mean, SE in parentheses)
Variance of PCP FEs 18.960 6.675 12.626 13.757 11.030
as % share of total variance (1.253) (2.604) (0.131) (0.138) (0.249)
Cov. of patient & PCP FEs 0.678 0.257 0.173 0.254 -0.059
as % share of total variance (1.183) (2.500) (0.124) (0.126) (0.239)
B. Other Statistics and Results (market or multi-market mean)
# of PCP fixed effects 1,011 1,261 726 867 526
# of patient-qtr. obs. 239,060 345,977 361,421 433,553 259,626
Mean of log util. 5.987 5.288 5.599 5.653 5.537
Std. dev. of log util. 0.878 0.847 0.791 0.798 0.781
Var. of log util. 0.770 0.717 0.628 0.639 0.612
Var. of PCP FEs 0.146 0.048 0.080 0.089 0.067
Std. dev. of PCP FEs 0.382 0.219 0.275 0.292 0.250
Notes: This table reports the results of the 306 within-market estimations of (a) the variance of
primary care physician (PCP) fixed effects (FEs) and (b) the covariance of the PCP fixed effects
and the patient fixed effects in a two-way fixed effects model. The estimation uses patient-quarter
level observations in the leave-out patient-PCP match procedure described in Section 1.5.1. The
outcome variable is the log of yearly primary care utilization in the past year. Column (1) reports
the results for Miami (a high-spending market), and Column (2) reports the results for Minneapolis
(a low-spending market). Column (3) reports the estimates for all 306 markets weighted by the
number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market. Columns (4)-(5) report the weighted
estimates of the above median and below median markets by spending. Columns (1) and (2) of
Panel A report estimates of the shares of utilization that are the variance of PCP fixed effects and
the covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects along with their corresponding standard
errors (SEs). In Columns (3)-(5) of Panel A, the PCP fixed effects share and the covariance of PCP
fixed effects and patient fixed effects share are the weighted means of the corresponding estimates,
and the standard errors are computed accordingly. The standard deviation of the PCP fixed effects
is imputed to be zero in markets where the point estimate of the variance of PCP fixed effects is
negative. The sample is the connected set for yearly utilization that omits the switch period in
Column (4) of Table 1.4 that remains connected when each patient-PCP pair is excluded. Markets
are hospital referral regions (HRRs).
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Table 1.8: Practice Styles Results: Variance in Yearly Tests and Imaging Utilization
Tests Imaging













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of within-market
estimations
306 153 153 306 153 153
A. Variance and Covariance Estimates (multi-market mean, SE in parentheses)
Variance of PCP FEs 5.916 6.527 5.053 2.730 2.921 2.460
as % share of total variance (0.142) (0.141) (0.277) (0.129) (0.132) (0.250)
Cov. of patient & PCP FEs 0.788 0.669 0.956 0.438 0.673 0.107
as % share of total variance (0.137) (0.134) (0.272) (0.127) (0.129) (0.247)
B. Other Statistics and Results (multi-market mean)
# of PCP fixed effects 726 867 526 726 867 526
# of patient-qtr. obs. 361,421 433,553 259,626 361,421 433,553 259,626
Mean of log util. 5.118 5.188 5.020 4.561 4.646 4.440
Std. dev. of log util. 1.482 1.478 1.489 2.609 2.596 2.628
Var. of log util. 2.206 2.192 2.225 6.815 6.746 6.912
Var. of PCP FEs 0.130 0.143 0.113 0.185 0.195 0.171
Std. dev. of PCP FEs 0.347 0.365 0.320 0.396 0.422 0.359
Notes: This table reports the results of the 306 within-market estimations of (a) the variance of
primary care physician (PCP) fixed effects (FEs) and (b) the covariance of the PCP fixed effects
and the patient fixed effects in a two-way fixed effects model. The estimation uses patient-quarter
level observations in the leave-out patient-PCP match procedure described in Section 1.5.1. The
outcome variable is the log of yearly utilization. Columns (1)-(3) report results for log of yearly
tests utilization, and Columns (4)-(5) report results for log of yearly imaging utilization. Columns
(1) and (4) report the estimates for all 306 markets weighted by the number of Original Medicare
beneficiaries in each market. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) report the estimates of the above median
and below median markets by spending, weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries
in the market. Panel A reports estimates of the shares of utilization that are the variance of PCP
fixed effects and the covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects as the weighted means
of the corresponding estimates across the within-market estimations, and the standard errors (SEs)
are computed accordingly. The standard deviation of the PCP fixed effects is imputed to be zero
in markets where the point estimate of the variance of PCP fixed effects is negative. The sample is
the connected set for yearly utilization that omits the switch period in Column (4) of Table 1.4 that
remains connected when each patient-PCP pair is excluded. Markets are hospital referral regions
(HRRs).
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Table 1.9: Practice Styles Results: Variance in Yearly Emergency Department and Hospital
Inpatient Utilization
Emergency Department Hospital Inpatient













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of within-market
estimations
306 153 153 306 153 153
A. Variance and Covariance Estimates (multi-market mean, SE in parentheses)
Variance of PCP FEs 1.571 1.626 1.493 2.055 2.585 1.307
as % share of total variance (0.151) (0.161) (0.284) (0.176) (0.158) (0.361)
Cov. of patient & PCP FEs -0.205 -0.085 -0.375 0.013 -0.160 0.257
as % share of total variance (0.149) (0.159) (0.280) (0.172) (0.153) (0.354)
B. Other Statistics and Results (multi-market mean)
# of PCP fixed effects 726 867 526 726 867 526
# of patient-qtr. obs. 361,421 433,553 259,626 361,421 433,553 259,626
Mean of log util. 1.350 1.383 1.305 1.062 1.107 0.999
Std. dev. of log util. 2.930 2.976 2.864 2.747 2.803 2.667
Var. of log util. 8.601 8.875 8.215 7.581 7.890 7.146
Var. of PCP FEs 0.137 0.147 0.123 0.164 0.208 0.102
Std. dev. of PCP FEs 0.351 0.362 0.335 0.383 0.422 0.329
Notes: This table reports the results of the 306 within-market estimations of (a) the variance of
primary care physician (PCP) fixed effects (FEs) and (b) the covariance of the PCP fixed effects
and the patient fixed effects in a two-way fixed effects model. The estimation uses patient-quarter
level observations in the leave-out patient-PCP match procedure described in Section 1.5.1. The
outcome variable is the log of yearly utilization. Columns (1)-(3) report results for log of yearly
emergency department utilization, and Columns (4)-(5) report results for log of yearly hospital
inpatient utilization. Columns (1) and (4) report the estimates for all 306 markets weighted by the
number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) report the
estimates of the above median and below median markets by spending, weighted by the number of
Original Medicare beneficiaries in the market. Panel A reports estimates of the shares of utilization
that are the variance of PCP fixed effects and the covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed
effects as the weighted means of the corresponding estimates across the within-market estimations,
and the standard errors (SEs) are computed accordingly. The standard deviation of the PCP fixed
effects is imputed to be zero in markets where the point estimate of the variance of PCP fixed effects
is negative. The sample is the connected set for yearly utilization that omits the switch period in
Column (4) of Table 1.4 that remains connected when each patient-PCP pair is excluded. Markets
are hospital referral regions (HRRs).
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Figure 1.1: Any Claim with Primary Care Physicians (PCPs) Around PCP Switch
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Notes: These figures present the patterns of having any PCP claim with any PCP, the origin PCP,
and the destination PCP around the time of a PCP switch. The vertical axis plots whether a patient
has a claim with a PCP in the quarter. The sample for Panel (a) includes only consistent patient-
PCP matches, which I define as patients who consistently assigned the origin PCP for 12 quarters
before the switch and consistently assigned the destination PCP for 12 quarters after the switch as
described in Table 1.5 Column (3). The sample for Panel (b) is a balanced panel of all patient-PCP
matches, i.e., patients who have any assigned main PCP in every quarter for 12 quarters before the
switch through 12 quarters after the switch as describe in Table 1.5 Column (2).
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Figure 1.2: Share of Primary Care Physician (PCP) Claims with Main PCP Around PCP
Switch
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Notes: These figures present the patterns of the share of claims with the origin PCP, and the
destination PCP (conditional on having any PCP claim) around the time of a PCP switch. The
vertical axis plots whether a patient has a claim with a PCP in the quarter. The sample for Panel (a)
includes only consistent patient-PCP matches, which I define as patients who consistently assigned
the origin PCP for 12 quarters before the switch and consistently assigned the destination PCP for
12 quarters after the switch as described in Table 1.5 Column (3). The sample for Panel (b) is a
balanced panel of all patient-PCP matches, i.e., patients who have any assigned main PCP in every
quarter for 12 quarters before the switch through 12 quarters after the switch as describe in Table
1.5 Column (2).
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Notes: These figures present the mean demographics-adjusted log utilization for patients who switch
PCPs as described in Section 1.3.1. The sample includes only consistent patient-PCP matches, who
are assigned the origin PCP for 12 quarters before the switch and the destination PCP for 12
quarters after the switch as described in Column (3) of Table 1.6. Each of the patients who switch
is classified into quartiles, defined within markets, by their origin PCP’s other patients (“copatients”)
in a pre-switch period (year -1) and their destination PCP’s copatients in a post-switch period (year
2). Quarters are binned into years, such that year 0 includes the last 4 quarters with a patient’s
origin PCP. The first quarter with the destination PCP is separated from the remainder of the year.
Log utilization adjusted for utilization for patient age, gender, and cohort/date.
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Notes: Each of these figures presents the distribution of 306 within-market estimated variances
of primary care physician (PCP) fixed effects as shares of the variance of total utilization. The
variance estimates come from a two-way fixed effects model with patient fixed effects and PCP
fixed effects. The estimation uses patient-quarter level observations in the leave-out patient-PCP
match procedure described in Section 1.5.1. The outcome variable in the estimations is the log
of yearly utilization in the past year. In Panel (a), the outcome variable is the log of yearly total
utilization in and the estimates correspond with the results in Table 1.6. In Panel (b), the outcome
variable is the log of yearly primary care utilization and the estimates correspond with the results in
Table 1.7. The histogram is unweighted, and the kernel density plots are unweighted and weighted
by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market.
37
Chapter 2
Effects of Switching Primary Care
Physicians on Healthcare Utilization
2.1 Introduction
Patients switch healthcare providers for a number of reasons, and many patients are forced to
switch healthcare providers due to physician retirements, physician relocations, and health
plan provider network changes. Health insurance payers are offering a greater number of
narrow network health plans, especially in health insurance marketplaces established by the
Affordable Care Act.1 Furthermore, an increasing number of older patients are joining private
Medicare Advantage plans (rather than Original Medicare), which have health plan networks
such that patients could lose access to their physicians when they switch health plans or their
health plan networks change. In fact, about one-third of Medicare Advantage enrollees are
in health plans with narrow physician networks (Jacobson, Rae, et al. 2017). Many patients
who switch into these narrow network plans discover that their physicians become out-
of-network, which means they have large financial incentives to leave their physicians and
switch to in-network physicians. PCP switches could have substantial effects on medical care
because PCPs hold information on patient medical history, informally coordinate care, and
in some cases, formally manage access to specialists. The effects of PCP switches on patient
healthcare utilization, in particular, has implications for the cost-effectiveness of policies that
reallocate patients across PCPs (e.g., narrow health plan networks), reduce involuntary PCP
switches, and facilitate PCP switches.
This chapter examines patient switches across PCPs to estimate switching costs, the
potentially excess healthcare utilization that is incurred when patients switch PCPs.2 My
empirical strategy uses patients who involuntarily switch PCPs because their PCPs leave
1Source: McKinsey Center for U.S. Health System Reform “Hospi-
tal Networks: Evolution of the Configurations on the 2015 Exchanges”
(https://healthcare.mckinsey.com/sites/default/files/2015HospitalNetworks.pdf).
2These switching “costs” could be positive (e.g., if patients receive redundant care) or negative (e.g., if
patients experience delays in care). Studies have found that some changes are associated with a temporary
increase in healthcare utilization. For example, Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams (2016) show that,
among patients who migrate across hospital referral regions (HRRs), “moving is correlated with an increase
in utilization, including a spike in utilization in the year of move.”
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their states or leave Medicare (generally due to retirement), so the timing of the PCP depar-
tures is exogenous to the patients. I use an event study model with PCP fixed effects and
patient fixed effects that is consistent with Chapter 1 such that I estimate the utilization of
patients who switch relative to the baseline of the same patients if they do not switch and
have the same PCPs.3
For patients who involuntarily switch PCPs, I find that switching costs are approxi-
mately $726 among patients who switch to PCPs in different physician practice groups and
$499 among patients who switch to PCPs in the same physician practice groups. Of these
switching costs, about 20-30% comes from short-run increases in primary care utilization,
with smaller though substantial contributions from short-run increases in tests, imaging, and
specialty care utilization. My estimation of switching costs focuses on healthcare utilization
and does not include other welfare-relevant costs, such as patient hassle costs of finding new
PCPs or medical record copy fees. Also, though switching PCPs generates immediate costs,
switching PCPs could produce some benefits that I do not capture (e.g., catching up on
delayed preventive care that leads to future, long-run savings).
Combining my findings with results from Chapter 1, I calculate counterfactuals that are
relevant for policies that seek to alter PCP practice styles and reallocate patients across
PCPs. The difference between PCPs at the 75th and 25th percentiles is $617 per year for
a representative patient. The difference between PCPs at the 60th and 40th percentiles is
substantially smaller, at $231 per year for a representative patient. The one-time cost of
$726 to reallocate patients across practice groups and the potential multi-year savings are
similar in magnitude. Therefore, policies that induce patients to switch to lower-spending
PCPs could potentially be counterproductive, especially since the one-time costs are paid
upfront and patients incur search and transactions costs that I do not capture in my anal-
ysis. Policymakers and payers would need to consider both long-run savings and short-run
switching costs.
This chapter contributes to the sparse literature on provider continuity and fragmenta-
tion by estimating costs of switching PCPs. Johnson, et al. (2016) find that physicians,
specifically obstetricians, make different clinical decisions for existing patients than for new
patients. Agha, Frandsen, and Rebitzer (2019) investigate the related concept of care frag-
mentation, in which a patient’s care is split across multiple physicians, and make comparisons
across healthcare markets. My study estimates the causal effects of switching PCPs – a form
of primary care fragmentation across time – keeping the healthcare markets constant.
More closely related papers examine the effects of PCP departures from the Veteran’s
Health Administration and the effects of PCP retirements in Medicare. Reddy et al. (2015)
study effects of provider turnover on patients whose primary care providers leave the Veterans
Health Administration. They find that patients with primary care provider turnover had
worse patient care experience but not significantly worse ambulatory care quality, except for
being less likely to control blood pressure. Zhang (2018) studies effects of PCP retirements
in Original Medicare. She finds that PCP retirements result in an increase in total spending,
a decline in primary care spending, and increases in specialty care and emergency care
3Since the timing of PCP switches is defined based on utilization (specifically patient visits with PCPs),
I aggregate the excess utilization over the quarters before and after the switches to measure the switching
costs independent from the exact timing of how the PCP switch is defined.
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spending. My study estimates effects of switching PCPs in a way that disentangles the short-
run effects from the long-run effects of switching PCPs by accounting for PCP compositional
changes that might be correlated with PCP retirements, relocations, or departures from
healthcare systems.
This chapter proceeds with the following sections. Section 2.2 describes the context of
my study, the data, and the sample. Section 2.3 presents my methodology for estimating
the costs of switching physicians, and Section 2.4 presents the results. Section 2.5 combines
the results from Chapter 1 with the switching costs results to construct counterfactuals.
Section 2.6 provides an overview of potential mechanisms that could generate the healthcare
utilization patterns. Section 2.7 concludes with a discussion of significance, limitations, and
policy implications.
2.2 Context, Data, and Sample
In this chapter, I use the context, data, and sample from Chapter 1 as described in Section
1.2. Patients in Original Medicare do not require referrals to see specialists and have access
to a relatively large network of physicians, so they may continue to visit their specialists or
substitute toward other forms of care even when they lose access to their PCPs and are in
the process of switching PCPs.
As discussed in Section 1.2.6, my outcome measures are payment-based utilization, which
I define to be total payments in dollars from Medicare, the patient, and any primary payer
(a payer who has primary responsibility for the payment, e.g., employer group health plan,
Department of Veteran Affairs).4,5 My two main outcome measures are (a) total utilization,
which is important for cost savings and policy, and (b) primary care utilization, which is
the category most likely to be affected by involuntary PCPs switches. I repeat my analyses
with other categories of utilization – including tests, imaging, emergency department visits,
inpatient hospitalizations, and specialty care – to examine the effects of PCP switches on
other medical care and investigate potential mechanisms through which PCP switches affect
total utilization.
2.3 Methodology: Physician Switching Costs
2.3.1 Event Study of Switches
I estimate the costs of switching PCPs in each of the 306 Hospital Referral Region (HRR)
markets. My empirical strategy uses samples of patients who involuntarily switch PCPs. I
classify a switch as involuntary if the patient’s main PCP leaves the state or leaves Medicare
(e.g., due to retirement) within one year before or after the main PCP switch.
4I include year-by-quarter fixed effects in my estimations, which accounts for inflation and other increases
in the prices of healthcare.
5In some cases Medicare is the primary payer and there is a secondary payer (e.g., Medigap supplemental
insurance), but I do not observe the payments made by the secondary payer versus the patient or the identity
of the secondary payer.
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I return to the model from Section 1.4.1, where my parameters of interest are now the
event time coefficients θg,k, which capture temporary utilization effects around the time
of a PCP switch. In contrast to Equation 1.1, I define γ˜j(i,t) as the PCP fixed effects that
correspond to baseline main PCPs and allow them to be different from those that correspond
to the main PCPs as defined in Section 1.4.1. The event study model with two-way fixed
effects is





θg,kDg,kit + εit, (2.1)
where αi are patient fixed effects, γ˜j(i,t) are baseline PCP fixed effects, xit are controls as
discussed in Section 1.4.1.
My goal is to estimate the excess utilization incurred due to involuntary PCP switches
relative to the baseline of the same patients having the same main PCPs. One empirical
challenge is to accurately define the baseline PCP. The main PCP assignment is retrospective,
so I allow the baseline main PCP fixed effect to be a weighted average between the origin









γj(i,t),destination if k ∈ [−2, 0]
γj(i,t) otherwise.
(2.2)
This specification assumes a simple linear decline in influence between the origin PCP and
the destination PCP.6,7
As in Section 1.4.1, I include indicators Dg,kit for whether patient has a specific type of
switch g that is k ∈ [−8, 12] quarters relative to the event time k = 0, the last quarter a
patient is assigned a main PCP. I define the leads to be whether the patient switches away
from their current main PCP and the lags to be whether the patient switched to their current
main PCP.8
In my specification, I include six types of switches g: (a1) involuntary switch between
two main PCPs in the same physician practice group, (a2) voluntary switch between two
main PCPs in the same physician practice group, (b1) involuntary switch between two main
PCPs in different physician practice groups, (b2) voluntary switch between two main PCPs
6The linear decline roughly matches the patterns in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. In ongoing work, I am examining
alternative main PCP weightings, including the simpler assignment rule in which the patient is assigned the
main PCP (i.e., such that all of the weight would be with the origin PCP and no weight would be on
the destination PCP in Equation 2.2), as well as the assignment rule in which the patient is assigned to
the destination PCP as the other extreme for robustness. I am also estimating the switching costs in a
specification that substitutes the long-run PCP fixed effects estimated using the specification from Section
1.5 and Equation 1.2 for γ˜j(i,t), such that only the patient fixed effects and the coefficients on event time
indicators and controls are estimated in Equation 2.1.
7In my estimation, I duplicate the observations with two different baseline main PCPs, assign each of the
two observations to either the origin PCP or the destination PCP, and weight the observations according to
Equation 2.2.
8In an alternative specification, I could include separate indicators for additional switches (e.g., leads for
whether a patient switches away from their next main PCP, lags for whether a patient switched to their
previous main PCP), but relatively few patients make these additional switches and any effects of these
additional switches would be less precisely estimated.
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in different physician practice groups, (c) from no main PCP to a main PCP, and (d) from
a main PCP to no main PCP.
For types of switches between two main PCPs (i.e., types (a1), (a2), (b1), and (b2)),
I further estimate a separate set of coefficients that correspond to patients who have a
balanced panel of indicators over k ∈ [−6, 8] – i.e., they are assigned to their origin PCPs for
k ∈ [−6, 0] and to their destination PCPs for k ∈ [1, 8].9 I use the estimated coefficients on
the balanced panel indicators in my switching cost estimations.
In standard event study designs, the main identifying assumption would be that utiliza-
tion does not change with other factors at the timing of the event (Jacobson, LaLonde, and
Sullivan 1993; McCrary 2007). An empirical challenge in my setting is that PCP switch
timing is defined based on patient PCP visits, so the coefficients θg,k are mechanically cor-
related with utilization and not directly interpretable. There are also potential pre-trends
as patients prepare to switch PCPs or as PCPs prepare to retire or relocate. My empirical
strategy relies on the fact that among the patients with involuntary switches, the timing of
the PCP departures is exogenous, and involuntary switches occur for all of the departing
PCPs’ patients. Only the exact timing of how PCP switches are defined is mechanically
correlated with non-switch related utilization patterns.
2.3.2 Switching Costs Estimation
To estimate the net switching costs, I take the sum over the utilization deviations from
baseline in terms of dollar spending using the coefficients θg,k estimated on the balanced
panels. My main identifying assumption is that the sum of patient utilization over a range of
quarters around the PCP switch is not systematically different for patients who involuntarily
switch PCPs for reasons other than the PCP switch events.
I define the switching costs Sˆga,b for the balanced panels of patients with switch type g as
the sum of the corresponding coefficients scaled to levels of dollar spending over the quarters













where yga is the mean log utilization of the patient-quarters in pre-event time a with switch
type g that scales the estimated coefficients θˆg,k to dollar spending.10
9Specifically, I generate separate sets of indicators for the balanced panel. Dg,kit consists of 186 indicators.
For the balanced panel, each of the four types of switches between PCPs has indicators for 15 event time
quarters k ∈ [−6, 8]. For the patient-quarters not in the balanced panel, each of the four types of switches
between PCPs has indicators for 21 event time quarters k ∈ [−8, 12]. Each of the two types of switches from
a PCP to no PCP has indicators for 9 event time quarters k ∈ [−8, 0]. Each of the two types of switches
from no PCP to a PCP has indicators for 12 event time quarters k ∈ [1, 12].
10In an alternative specification, I could allow the pre-event time to differ from the first quar-









, where ygc is the mean log utilization of the patient-quarters in pre-event
time c with switch type g that scales the estimated coefficients θˆg,k to dollar spending.
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I estimate Equation 2.1 with a = −6 and b = 8 within each market with robust standard
errors three-way clustered by patient, by main PCP, and by quarter. For each market, I
then compute the switching costs Sˆga,b in Equation 2.3 and the standard errors using the
delta method allowing for correlation across the estimated coefficients θˆg,k (across both g
and k) among the balanced panels within each market.11 The estimated switching costs
include effects on utilization from six quarters before to eight quarters after the switch and
are scaled by the mean utilization for switch group g at six quarters before the switch.
2.3.3 Estimation Outcome Measures and Samples
My main outcome measures are contemporaneous quarterly log utilization.12 I also use this
outcome measure in my practice styles analysis in Chapter 1 and present the results in
Appendix C.2.
For my estimation sample, I use the “connected set” sample of PCPs and patients that I
define in Section 1.5.1. The PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects are identified within
this connected set. I do not omit the patient-quarter observations that correspond to the
switch period. For the balanced panels, I allow for the pre-switch and post-switch main
PCPs combined to meet the requirement that patients visit their main PCPs for at least
75% of their PCP visits over the past year.13 Column (3) of Table 1.4 reports the summary
statistics.14
2.4 Results: Physician Switching Costs
2.4.1 Switching Costs from Involuntary Switchers
Table 2.1 reports the main results on switching costs. Each column represents the results
from 306 hospital referral region (HRR) market-level regressions weighted by their Original
Medicare population.15,16 The first four rows report the switching costs and standard errors
11By estimating the event study regressions by market, I allow the event study coefficients to vary across
markets as they do in the two-way fixed effects model estimation. In principle, I could estimate switching
costs in one event study regression with the full, multi-market sample by including market fixed effects and
interactions of market fixed effects and the controls. In practice, this approach is not yet computationally
feasible due to the large number of observations, the large number of event time indicators, and the large
number of fixed effects. In ongoing work, I am estimating the switching costs in one event study regression
with the full, multi-market sample, but in a specification that substitutes the long-run PCP fixed effects
estimated using the specification from Section 1.5 and Equation 1.2 for γ˜j(i,t). With this approach, only the
patient fixed effects and the coefficients on event time indicators and controls need to be estimated in the
full, multi-market sample in Equation 2.1.
12I use quarterly utilization such that yit is defined as the log of sum of the current quarter of utilization
and one.
13I do not include the non-balanced sample because doing so would add noise to the estimates of my PCP
fixed effects.
14In ongoing work, I am also using subsamples corresponding to patients and PCPs in Table 1.4 Column
(4) for comparison, though they have fewer observations.
15I compute the weighted means of the point estimates, means, and counts. I compute the standard errors
that correspond to the weighted point estimates.
16Results are similar with an unweighted average across HRRs.
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for the balanced panels of involuntary switchers. The last four rows report the switching
costs and standard errors for the balanced panels of voluntary switchers.
Column (1) of Table 2.1 reports the results for total utilization. The total utilization
switching costs are $499 for patients who involuntarily switch PCPs to destination PCPs
within the same practice groups as the origin PCPs and $726 for patients who involuntarily
switch PCPs to destination PCPs in different practice groups from the origin PCPs, on aver-
age across markets. Column (2) of Table 2.1 reports the results for primary care utilization.
The primary care utilization switching costs are $144 for patients who involuntarily switch
PCPs to destination PCPs within the same practice groups and $160 for patients who in-
voluntarily switch PCPs to destination PCPs in different practice groups on average across
markets. These results suggest that approximately 20-30% of the total switching costs comes
from temporary increases in primary care utilization.
Figures 2.1a and 2.1b plot the estimated event study coefficients with a balanced panel
over k ∈ [−6, 8] for involuntary switchers from 306 hospital referral region (HRR) market-
level regressions weighted by their Original Medicare population.17 As shown in Figure 1.1,
patients are mechanically more likely to have utilization at event times k = −3 and k = 1
based on the definition of PCP switches. There are no pre-trends before event time k = −4,
which supports my identifying assumption that patients who involuntarily switch PCPs do
not have systematically different utilization for reasons other than the PCP switch events.
Furthermore, the coefficients are approximately zero at k = −6 and k = 8, which means
that accounting for switching costs from six quarters before to eight quarters after the switch
accurately captures the majority of switching costs. I define my switching costs over this
shorter range for a larger balanced panel of patients. Table A.11 reports the results with
balanced panels over multiple event time ranges (k ∈ [−4, 6], k ∈ [−6, 8], and k ∈ [−8, 12])
and switching costs calculated over multiple event time ranges (k ∈ [−4, 6], k ∈ [−6, 8], and
k ∈ [−8, 12]) for comparison, and Table A.4 reports the descriptive statistics for the balanced
samples.
The difference in primary care switching costs for (a) patients who switch to destination
PCPs in the same practice groups and (b) patients who switch to destination PCPs in
different practice groups is similar in magnitude to the differences in prices between new
patient office visits and established patient office visits as shown in Table 1.3.18 I cannot
interpret the differences between these two groups of switchers as causal though. The patients
in these two groups might be different (e.g., patients whose origin PCPs are the only PCPs in
their practice groups would need to switch to destination PCPs in different practice groups),
and the choice to switch PCP practice groups might be voluntary.
To examine components of switching costs and consider potential mechanisms, I examine
tests, imaging, emergency department visits, inpatient hospitalizations, and specialty care.
In Table 2.1, Column (3) reports results for tests utilization, Column (4) reports the results
for imaging utilization, Column (5) reports the results for emergency department utilization,
Column (6) reports the results for hospital inpatient utilization, and Column (7) reports
17For these figures, I average the coefficients and calculate their standard errors across the 306 hospital
referral region (HRR) market-level regressions separately for each point for illustrative purposes. I do not
use these aggregated coefficients in the computation of switching costs.
18A patient who has visited the physician or the practice group within the past three years is classified as
an established patient.
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the results for specialty care utilization. These results suggest that temporary increases in
tests utilization account for approximately 5-7%, temporary increases in imaging utilization
account for about 3%, and temporary increases in specialty care utilization account for
approximately 3-5% of total switching costs on average across markets. Temporary increases
in emergency department and hospital inpatient utilization, though statistically significant,
contribute to less than 1% of total switching costs.
2.4.2 Comparison of Voluntary and Involuntary Switches
My analysis thus far focuses on involuntary switches. Voluntary switches and involuntary
switches may capture different costs of switching that affect the interpretation of the results.
The involuntary switchers sample consists of patients who are forced to switch PCPs,
potentially with various degrees of warning or notification. Involuntary switchers may be
more likely to experience delayed care. Patients who switch to PCPs within the same practice
groups might switch to destination PCPs who suddenly have more patients because the origin
PCPs left the practice groups. Patients who switch to PCPs in other practice groups may
face search costs in finding new PCPs and need to wait for new patient appointments.
The voluntary switchers sample consists of patients who generally choose to switch PCPs.
They may plan their switch and be less likely to experience delayed care. Some patients
may choose to switch PCPs for second opinions on health conditions. Table 2.1 shows
that voluntary switchers have higher switching costs than involuntary switchers, and their
utilization patterns are similar to those of involuntary switchers.19
In evaluating potential policies to reallocate patients across PCPs, policymakers would
need to consider whether the switching costs would be similar to those of involuntary switches
or whether they would likely be larger, as in the case of voluntary switches.
2.5 Counterfactuals
With estimates of the long-run and short-run effects of switching PCPs, I now consider
counterfactuals that alter PCP practice styles or reallocate patients across PCPs. I first
calculate the differences in utilization between percentiles of PCP practice styles, as measured
by spending. I then construct two sets of counterfactuals that roughly represent two extremes
of reallocating patients across PCPs within their markets in a partial equilibrium context.
In these counterfactuals, I provide results that correspond to representative patients in a
representative market in the U.S.20
My goal is to estimate the difference between the observed utilization and counterfactual
utilization when the PCP practice style, γj(i,t), is changed for a subpopulation of PCPs.
19Figures B.5 and B.6 plot the involuntary switches on the same plots as the involuntary switches. Ta-
ble A.12 reports the estimates and Figure B.9 plots the estimates in which the involuntary switchers and
voluntary switchers are pooled and share sets of event study indicators.
20I construct counterfactuals at the U.S. national level because individual market-level estimates of the
variance of PCP fixed effects and the covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects are noisily
estimated. The estimated PCP fixed effects γˆj in each market from Section 1.5.1, which are estimated from
an ordinary least squares regression of Equation 1.2, have substantial sampling error. The variances of PCP
fixed effects calculated from these estimates are positively biased.
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I return to my utilization measure from Section 1.5.1 that partials out the effects of the
controls xit and the effects of the switching indicators Dg,kit






where yit is the log utilization outcome and coefficients βˆ and θˆg,k are estimated from the
first-stage ordinary least squares regression of Equation 1.2.
To construct counterfactual utilization patterns, I first find the expected utilization con-
ditional on a given γj(i,t), denoted as γj(i,t)∗ , because I change different sets of γj(i,t) in the
various counterfactuals. I assume that αi and γj(i,t) have a bivariate normal distribution,
both normalized to have mean zero.21 With this assumption, the conditional expectation of













) γj(i,t)∗ + γj(i,t)∗ + y¯ (2.5)
where the first term is the patient component, γ∗j(i,t,) is the PCP component, and y¯ is the sam-















) γj(i,t)∗ + γCF + y¯ (2.6)
where the first term is again the patient component, γCF is the counterfactual PCP compo-
nent, and y¯ is again the sample mean utilization.
I convert the differences between the observed utilization and counterfactual utilization
from the log of dollars spending to levels of dollars spending. I define Dit = exp (y˜it)− 1 for





−1 for counterfactual levels of spending.
The expected difference in levels of dollars spending conditional on patients at a PCP with




















)− exp (γCF )] .
To calculate the expected difference for patients at a range of PCP fixed effects γj(i,t)∗ ∈
[γ`, γu] that corresponds with patients reallocated to PCPs with counterfactual effect γCF ,
I take the integral over the corresponding range of PCP fixed effects γj(i,t)∗ ∈ [γ`, γu]. The
expression is
21The distribution is at the patient-quarter observation level, consistent with the estimation in Section
1.5.











































across markets from Section 1.5.22 The share of patients reallocated ap-
proximately corresponds to the percentiles I consider in my counterfactuals (e.g., reallocating
patients at the top 10% of PCP observations means reallocating 10% of patients).23
My first set of results calculates the utilization difference from reallocating patients from
one PCP to another PCP as in Equation 2.7. I calculate the counterfactuals in which (a)
patients at 75th percentile PCPs are reallocated to 25th percentile PCPs and (b) patients at
60th percentile PCPs are reallocated to 40th percentile PCPs within their markets. Column
(1) in Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the results. The difference between PCPs at the 75th
and 25th percentiles is $617 per year for a representative patient. The difference between
PCPs at the 60th and 40th percentiles is $231 per year for a representative patient.
In my second set of results, I consider cases in which health insurance payers could identify
and target the highest spending PCPs. Specifically, I consider the simple counterfactuals in
which patients who visit high-spending PCPs are reallocated to median PCPs using Equation
2.8. This counterfactual would be around the upper bound of the potential cost savings
because these types of switches could occur if patients do not sort to PCPs with the same
practice styles (e.g., if patients at high-spending PCPs do not sort back to high-spending
PCPs) or are incentivized to switch to PCPs with specific practice styles. For instance, a
health insurance plan could induce patients to switch to PCPs in narrow networks or PCPs in
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in which those PCPs are roughly near the median
of the PCP practice style distribution. Column (1) in Panel B of Table 2.2 reports the
results. Policies that reallocate patients from the top 10% or top 30% of PCPs to a median
PCP would yield mean savings of $970 and $611, respectively, per year for a representative
patient.
I then consider a similar set of counterfactuals in which high-spending PCPs are excluded
but patients are reallocated to the highest-spending remaining PCPs using Equation 2.8.
This counterfactual would be around the lower bound of the potential cost savings and
roughly maintains the sorting of patients across PCPs. Column (1) in Panel C of Table
2.2 reports the results. Policies that reallocate patients from the top 10% of PCPs to 90th
percentile PCPs or from the top 30% of PCPs to 70th percentile PCPs would yield mean
savings of only $304 and $359, respectively, per year for a representative patient.
These estimates of potential reallocation savings are similar in magnitude to the short-
run switching costs of $499-726 that I estimate in Section 2.3. Policies that induce patients
22The individual market-level estimates are substantially more noisily estimated.
23The percentage is not precise because the patients who would be reallocated based on all patient-quarter
observations in the panel are not necessarily the same as the patients who would be reallocated based on a
cross-section of patient-quarter observations in a specific quarter.
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to switch to lower-spending PCPs would need to consider both long-run savings and short-
run switching costs. Whether policies that reallocate patients away from high-spending
PCPs could actually be cost effective depends on (a) whether health insurance payers could
accurately identify and target high-spending PCPs, (b) whether patients are reallocated to
median-spending PCPs or return to other relatively high-spending PCPs, and (c) how long
patients would remain matched with their new PCPs.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.2 report the “break-even” number of years, which is the
minimum time period that patients would need to be matched with their counterfactual
PCPs versus their observed PCPs for the reallocations to have net cost savings, without
discounting. In the sample, patients are matched with PCPs for a median of 4 years, which
is close to the break-even time period ranges.24
When policies take into account the discounting of future savings, the upfront switching
costs in terms of utilization that patients would need to at least partially incur, and other
switching costs not captured by the utilization estimates (e.g., search costs, medical record
copy fees), the reallocation of patients could potentially be counterproductive.
2.6 Potential Mechanisms
I have abstracted away from the mechanisms that generate the short-run switching costs thus
far. Multiple potential mechanisms likely generate these switching costs and the utilization
patterns they reflect, and the mechanisms have different implications for patient welfare.
2.6.1 Primary Care Disruption
One effect of involuntary PCP switches is a disruption in primary care. Patients may lose
access to primary care if their departing PCPs are sole practitioners (i.e., the only PCPs
in their physician practice groups). Patients may experience delays in obtaining new PCPs
and seeking primary care, which would generate negative switching costs for some patients
in the short run.
These delays could be due to a few factors: (a) wait times for new patient appointments,
(b) lack of information (e.g., before PCPs make planned departures), (c) inattention (e.g.,
to notification of PCPs departures before the patients seek primary care), and (d) procras-
tination (e.g., of beneficial primary care due to immediate search and transaction costs in
obtaining new PCPs).
Patients could delay primary care due to wait times for new patient appointments with
PCPs. Average surveyed wait times for family medicine physicians range from 20 to 29
days in major U.S. metropolitan areas, though the wait times vary greatly by the specific
physician or the market.25 Patients might not be informed of planned PCP retirements and
24In quarter 1 of 2007 (approximately the midpoint of the sample), the median spell length of a patient-
PCP match in this cross section of patients is 16 quarters; the 25th percentile is 7 quarters, and the 75th
percentile is 28 quarters.
25Source: Merritt Hawkins Survey of Physician Appointment Wait Times and Medicare and Medicaid
Acceptance Rates 2017
(https://www.merritthawkins.com/uploadedFiles/MerrittHawkins/Content/Pdf/mha2017waittimesurveyPDF.pdf).
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relocations because state laws vary in when physicians are required to notify their patients
(e.g., at the time of departure, no later than 30 days prior to departure) (Wall 2005).
Behavioral factors – such as inattention and procrastination – contribute to health-
care delays and underuse in areas such as preventive care, chronic conditions management,
and prescription drugs (Bai, Handel, Miguel, and Rao 2017; Baicker, Mullainathan, and
Schwartzstein 2015). Inattention occurs because patients have limited time and cognitive
resources to process information. In a given time period, with some positive probability,
patients are not aware of information (e.g., a PCP’s planned departure) or potential actions
(e.g., finding a new PCP) (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009). Procrastination occurs because pa-
tients may be present-biased and naive about their present bias (DellaVigna and Malmendier
2006; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999; O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001). With procrastination,
patients delay actions they know are beneficial (e.g., finding new PCPs and seeking primary
care) due to immediate costs (e.g., search and transaction costs).
In ongoing work, I am examining delays in primary care due to PCP retirements and
relocations. My main outcome measures are “new patient” office visits, which are for patients
who have not visited either the PCPs or the physician practice groups within the past three
years, and “established patient” office visits. Preliminary results show that patients on aver-
age experience an immediate decline in primary care visits following their PCP retirements
and relocations. This decline comes from a decline in established office visits and is partially
offset by an increase in new office visits. The primary care visits decline is greater for patients
whose PCPs are sole practitioners than for patients whose PCPs are part of multi-physician
practice groups. Also, as observed in Section 2.4, even patients whose PCPs are part of
multi-physician practice groups switch to PCPs in different practice groups, which could
result in primary care delays.
2.6.2 Substitution Away from Primary Care
Patients who lose access to their PCPs and physician practice groups (in the case of PCPs
who are sole practitioners) may substitute from primary care to other sources of care before
they have appointments with new PCPs. These other sources of care include retail health
clinics, urgent care facilities/centers, emergency departments, and specialist physicians. Pa-
tient substitution to emergency departments and some urgent care facilities/centers would
increase healthcare spending due to their higher prices. For patient substitution to retail
health clinics, healthcare spending might not necessarily increase and could provide valuable
care to patients who do not have access to PCPs. For example, Mehrotra et al. (2008)
find that retail clinics appear to serve patient populations that are underserved by PCPs.
However, patient substitution to retail health clinics could result in inefficient care if the
retail health clinics do not have access to patient medical records or delay the development
of patient relationships with new PCPs.
In ongoing work, I am examining patient substitution to urgent care facilities/centers,
emergency department, and specialist physicians.26 Section 2.4 shows that patients who
26The CMS Place of Service code for “Walk-in Retail Health Clinic” has an effective date of May 1,
2010, so I am not able to measure visits to retail health clinics for most of my sample period. Source:
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/place-of-service-codes/Place_of_Service_Code_Set.html.
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switch PCPs significantly increase emergency department utilization and specialty care uti-
lization. Some of this increased emergency department utilization and specialty care utiliza-
tion could potentially be driven by substitution. I can measure the excess patient visits to
emergency departments and specialist physicians after the patients lose access to their PCPs
and before the patients visit their new PCPs, which would capture substitution effects.
2.6.3 Comprehensive or Improved Primary Care Evaluation
Patients may receive some health benefits from switching PCPs in the form of more compre-
hensive or improved primary care evaluations. Patients who are new to PCPs and new to
physician practice groups have “new patient” office visits that cover more components and
are longer on average than “established patient” office visits. Even new PCPs whose patients
switched from within the same practice groups may conduct more comprehensive evalua-
tions of the new patients. These more comprehensive evaluations may help the patients
catch up on delayed preventive care, encourage patients to seek delayed specialty care, and
identify missed diagnoses. Furthermore, some PCPs are better (e.g., in terms of knowledge,
skill, or expertise) for at least certain subsets of medical conditions. Therefore, switching
PCPs either across or within practice groups could potentially lead to improved evaluations.
More comprehensive or improved primary are evaluations could improve patient welfare and
potentially lead to long-run savings.
In ongoing work, I am investigating whether patients catch up on delayed preventive
care, visit specialist physicians, and receive new diagnoses upon visiting new PCPs. Not all
visits to specialist physicians or new diagnoses are necessarily beneficial or cost-effective, so
further research that examine associated patient health outcomes would be valuable.
2.6.4 Inefficient Primary Care or Care Coordination
Beyond the potential inefficiencies discussed in Sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2, switching PCPs could
generate some inefficiencies that lead to higher healthcare utilization, such as redundant care
or lower PCP productivity. New PCPs may spend time documenting medical history and
order redundant lab tests to establish new medical records. PCPs may be less productive
with new patients, and for example, take two visits to diagnose and treat medical conditions
rather than one visit for established patients. Furthermore, PCPs who are less familiar
with patients could potentially provide lower quality medical care, leading to adverse health
consequences and subsequent higher healthcare utilization.
In ongoing work, I am examining the effect of PCP switches on low-value care. I use
the low-value care measures that Schwartz, et al. (2014) construct from Original Medicare
administrative claims.27 The six categories of low-value care are: low-value cancer screening,
27Schwartz, et al. (2014) include services that “have been characterized as low value by the American
Board of Internal Medicine Foundation’s Choosing Wisely initiative, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force
’D’ recommendations, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence ’do not do’ recommendations,
the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health health technology assessments, or peer-reviewed
medical literature” and that are “relevant to the Medicare population and could be detected using Medicare
claims with reasonable specificity, meaning that major clinical factors distinguishing likely overuse from
appropriate use could be identified or approximated with claims and enrollment data.”
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low-value diagnostic and preventive testing, low-value preoperative testing, low-value imag-
ing, low-value cardiovascular testing and procedures, and other low-value surgical procedures.
Section 2.4 shows that patients who switch PCPs significantly increase tests utilization and
imaging utilization. Preliminary results show that at least some of the increases in tests
utilization and imaging utilization could be classified as low-value care.
I am also examining the effect of PCP switches on the quality of primary care by measur-
ing ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs) as defined for the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) Prevention Quality Indicators.28 The AHRQ defines ACSCs
as “conditions for which good outpatient care can potentially prevent the need for hospitaliza-
tion or for which early intervention can prevent complications or more severe disease.”29 The
ACSCs relevant for the elderly Medicare population can be classified into three categories:
acute admissions, diabetes admissions, and other chronic conditions admissions.
Finally, I am examining the effect of PCP switches on the intensity of medical treat-
ments by measuring preference-sensitive care. The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care defines
preference-sensitive care as, “treatments for conditions where legitimate treatment options
exist – options involving significant tradeoffs among different possible outcomes of each treat-
ment.”30,31
2.6.5 Idiosyncrasies Across Primary Care Physicians
Finally, some components of the temporary increase in healthcare utilization could be due to
idiosyncrasies across PCPs that are within the range of acceptable physician discretion and
do not necessarily generate health benefits for patients or inefficiencies. Individual PCPs
differ (e.g., in training, experience, expertise) such that switching to new PCPs could lead
to new diagnoses, diagnostic tests, and specialist visits. For example, different PCPs may
be more likely to refer patients to specialists for different conditions.
2.7 Discussion
2.7.1 Significance and Limitations
I estimate switching costs among patients who involuntarily switch PCPs because their
physicians relocate or retire using an event study framework with both patient fixed effects
and PCP fixed effects to control for any changes in PCP composition. I find that the
28See the AHRQ “Prevention Quality Indicators Overview” webpage
(https://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/modules/pqi_overview.aspx) for details.
29Source: Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care “Preference-Sensitive Care” webpage
(http://archive.dartmouthatlas.org/keyissues/issue.aspx?con=2938).
30Source:
31The preference-sensitive care categories are: (a) mastectomy for early-stage breast cancer, (b) coronary
artery bypass grafting (CABG) surgery for stable angina, (c) percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI)
for stable angina, (d) back surgery for low back pain, (e) knee replacement for osteoarthritis of the knee
joints, (f) hip replacement for osteoarthritis of hip joints, (g) carotid endarterectomy for carotid artery
disease, (h) cholecystectomy for gallstones, (h) transurethral resection of the prostate (TURP) for benign
prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), (i) prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test for early-stage prostate cancer, and (j)
prostatectomy for early-stage prostate cancer.
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cost of changing PCPs is approximately $499-726 per switch, and about 20-30% of these
switching costs come from short-run increases in primary care utilization. These switching
costs also come from other medical care, such as tests, imaging, and specialty care. In my
counterfactuals, I find that the potential savings from reallocating patients to lower-spending
PCPs are approximately the same magnitude as the switching costs.
My study has a few limitations. First, my research design does not comprehensively
capture costs and benefits associated with PCP switches. My estimation of switching costs
focuses on spending in Medicare claims and does not include other welfare-relevant costs,
such as patient hassle costs of finding new PCPs and medical record copy fees. Also, my
estimation focuses on short-run effects of switching PCPs within the first two to three years
and does not capture long-run effects. Though switching PCPs generates immediate costs,
switching PCPs could produce some benefits that I do not capture (e.g., catching up on
delayed preventive care that leads to future, long-run savings).
Second, the counterfactuals can be interpreted only as partial equilibrium results in the
context of Original Medicare. The data in this study are limited to 20% of Original Medicare
patients, so I cannot observe capacity constraints and how likely they would bind even under
more realistic counterfactuals. Also, a broader model of physician supply would be needed to
make predictions on general equilibrium PCP supply-side responses to hypothetical policies.
For example, if health plans incentivized patients to switch to lower-spending PCPs (e.g.,
through high deductibles, narrow health plan networks), higher-spending PCPs may respond
by decreasing their patients’ utilization on average.
Third, my main aggregate results likely mask heterogeneity both across PCPs and across
patients. PCPs vary in the way they manage departures from practices and retirements;
some PCPs refer patients to other PCPs, whereas others do not. Patients experience different
long-run and short-run effects when they switch to different PCPs based on various factors,
including patient demographic characteristics, patient chronic conditions, and healthcare
market characteristics.
2.7.2 Policy Implications
My findings have implications for policies that reallocate patients across physicians, such as
through health plan networks, and for patients who seek to switch health plans. Patients
and payers (depending on cost-sharing) would bear the switching costs of $726 per switch on
average across markets.32 There are a couple of levers that health plans can use to change the
distribution of PCPs that patients visit: (a) restricting PCPs from joining the network, and
(b) excluding previously in-network PCPs from the network (e.g., not renewing contracts).
With such high switching costs, a health plan may prefer to keep a high-spending PCP in
their network rather than to exclude that PCP and force that PCP’s patients to switch to
other in-network PCPs. Similarly, a patient may actually spend less on medical care by
keeping a slightly more expensive health plan than switching to a cheaper health plan in
which their PCP is out-of-network. More broadly, my research relates to the literature on
health plan networks and offers additional context for its findings. For example, Gruber
32In some cases, the payers would pass the costs back to other patients (e.g., through increased premiums,
Medicare payroll taxes).
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and McKnight (2016) find that savings from limited network plans are concentrated among
patients whose PCPs are included in those limited network health plans. My results relate
to this finding and suggest that temporarily higher utilization due to PCP switches could
lead to reduced cost savings among patients who lose access to their PCPs when they switch
to lower-cost health plans.
My finding of substantial switching costs has implications for the broad class of policies
that aim to reduce involuntary physician switching, facilitate the transfer of medical records,
and otherwise mitigate switching costs. To reduce involuntary PCP switches, governments
may choose to enact policies to increase network transparency and restrict changes in provider
networks during plan years. To help reduce redundant information acquisition, policies could
incentivize improvements in the portability of electronic health records, and states could place
stricter limits on medical record copy fees. In the literature, Baker, Bundorf, and Kessler
(2015) find that patients from states that adopted limits on medical record copy fees are
significantly more likely to switch physicians. This finding suggests that reducing switching
costs in utilization could also potentially lead to more efficient levels of PCP switching (e.g.,
a patient who relocates locally may prefer to switch to another PCP who is closer to their
new residence).
2.7.3 Conclusion
The significant switching costs I find suggest that policies that induce patients to switch
to lower-spending PCPs could potentially be counterproductive and would need to consider
both long-run savings and short-run switching costs. Future research could investigate the
effectiveness of cost-saving strategies that incentivize patients to switch PCPs, such as nar-
row network health plans, and the incidence of these switching costs between patients and
payers. Future research could also study the effects of policies that promote positive ef-
fects of switching PCPs (either with or without actual PCP switching) or that help mitigate
negative effects of switching PCPs. Regarding positive effects of switching PCPs, if more
comprehensive primary care evaluations are valuable, then policies could incentivize PCPs to
provide occasional comprehensive evaluations (e.g., with greater reimbursement for longer
appointment times). Regarding negative effects of switching PCPs, policies could require
that health plan networks include adequate numbers of PCPs to reduce primary care delays,
and payers could incentivize the adoption of technology to facilitate medical records trans-
fers. Health insurance plans could help match patients to new PCPs to reduce primary care
delays and incentivize these new PCPs to reduce redundant medical care.
More generally, additional research is needed to quantify broader efficiency and welfare
implications associated with my findings on physician practice styles and switching costs.
Studies in healthcare face challenges in estimating welfare from effects on health outcomes,
particularly in primary care settings where effects on objective measures of health status
available in administrative claims data (e.g., mortality, readmissions) are likely to be small.
Richer electronic medical records would enable researchers to use a broader range of health
outcomes (e.g., blood pressure and cholesterol level measurements) to understand the influ-
ence of PCPs on efficiency and welfare.
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Table 2.2: Counterfactuals: Yearly Total Utilization
Years to Break Even by
Mean Savings per Any Practice Group Switch
Switch per Year ($) Same Group Different Group
(1) (2) (3)
A. Reallocation Between Two Specific Percentiles
Between 25-75th percentiles 617 0.81 1.18
Between 40-60th percentiles 231 2.16 3.14
B. Reallocation of Top Deciles to Median
Top 10% to median 970 0.51 0.75
Top 20% to median 751 0.67 0.97
Top 30% to median 611 0.82 1.19
Top 40% to median 504 0.99 1.44
Top 50% to median 415 1.20 1.75
C. Reallocation of Top Deciles to Other High-Spending Percentiles
Top 10% to 90th percentile 304 1.64 2.39
Top 20% to 80th percentile 332 1.50 2.18
Top 30% to 70th percentile 359 1.39 2.02
Top 40% to 60th percentile 385 1.30 1.88
Notes: This table reports the results for counterfactuals for total utilization as described in Section
2.5. Panel A reports the hypothetical scenario in which patients are reallocated (a) from a 75th
percentile PCP to a 25th percentile PCP or (b) from a 60th percentile PCP to a 40th percentile
PCP in terms of total utilization. Panel B reports the counterfactuals in which patients who have
PCPs estimated to be in the top deciles of utilization are reallocated to a median PCP. Panel C
reports the counterfactuals in which patients who have PCPs estimated to be in the top deciles of
utilization are reallocated to PCPs at the highest non-excluded percentile. Column (1) reports the
mean savings per switch per year. Columns (2) and (3) report the time to “break even” given the
switching costs estimated in Section 2.3 of $499 for PCP switches within the same practice groups
and $726 for PCP switches to different practice groups.
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Quarter Relative to PCP Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
Different Practice Group Same Practice Group 95% CI
Notes: Each of these figures plots the event study estimates from 306 within-market event study
regressions weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market as described
in Section 2.3.1. The outcome variable in the regressions is the log of quarterly utilization. In Panel
(a), the outcome variable is the log of quarterly total utilization. In Panel (b), the outcome variable
is the log of quarterly primary care utilization. Each event study regression includes a primary care
physician (PCP) fixed effect, a patient fixed effect, sets of event time indicators corresponding to
types of switches, and controls for age, gender, and date/cohort. For each of the switch type, the
event study regression includes a set of event time indicators for a balanced panel of patients who
are always assigned the origin PCP for 6 quarters before the switch and the destination PCP for
8 quarters after a switch. The sample is the connected set for quarterly utilization that does not
omit the switch period in Column (3) of Table 1.4.
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Quarter Relative to PCP Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
Different Practice Group Same Practice Group 95% CI
Notes: Each of these figures plots the event study estimates from 306 within-market event study
regressions weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market as described
in Section 2.3.1. The outcome variable in the regressions is the log of quarterly utilization. In Panel
(a), the outcome variable is the log of quarterly tests utilization. In Panel (b), the outcome variable
is the log of quarterly imaging utilization. Each event study regression includes a primary care
physician (PCP) fixed effect, a patient fixed effect, sets of event time indicators corresponding to
types of switches, and controls for age, gender, and date/cohort. For each of the switch type, the
event study regression includes a set of event time indicators for a balanced panel of patients who
are always assigned the origin PCP for 6 quarters before the switch and the destination PCP for
8 quarters after a switch. The sample is the connected set for quarterly utilization that does not
omit the switch period in Column (3) of Table 1.4.
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Figure 2.3: Switching Costs Results: Emergency Department and Hospital Inpatient Uti-
lization
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Different Practice Group Same Practice Group 95% CI
Notes: Each of these figures plots the event study estimates from 306 within-market event study
regressions weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market as described
in Section 2.3.1. The outcome variable in the regressions is the log of quarterly utilization. In Panel
(a), the outcome variable is the log of quarterly emergency department utilization. In Panel (b),
the outcome variable is the log of quarterly inpatient hospitalization utilization. Each event study
regression includes a primary care physician (PCP) fixed effect, a patient fixed effect, sets of event
time indicators corresponding to types of switches, and controls for age, gender, and date/cohort.
For each of the switch type, the event study regression includes a set of event time indicators for a
balanced panel of patients who are always assigned the origin PCP for 6 quarters before the switch
and the destination PCP for 8 quarters after a switch. The sample is the connected set for quarterly
utilization that does not omit the switch period in Column (3) of Table 1.4.
CHAPTER 2. PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN SWITCHING COSTS 58
Figure 2.4: Switching Costs Results: Specialty Care Utilization
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Notes: This figure plots the event study estimates from 306 within-market event study regressions
weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market as described in Section
2.3.1. The outcome variable in the regressions is the log of quarterly utilization. In Panel (a),
the outcome variable is the log of quarterly specialty care utilization. Each event study regression
includes a primary care physician (PCP) fixed effect, a patient fixed effect, sets of event time
indicators corresponding to types of switches, and controls for age, gender, and date/cohort. For
each of the switch type, the event study regression includes a set of event time indicators for a
balanced panel of patients who are always assigned the origin PCP for 6 quarters before the switch
and the destination PCP for 8 quarters after a switch. The sample is the connected set for quarterly
utilization that does not omit the switch period in Column (3) of Table 1.4.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for Practice Styles Estimation Samples: Patients in Con-
nected Sets and Leave-Out Connected Sets
Yearly Outcome w/o Switch
Main Connected Sets Leave-Out Connected Sets
Analysis All All Switchers
Sample Patients Patients Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Patients (thousands) 7,512 4,464 4,323 647
Female (%) 58.5 60.4 60.3 65.3
White (%) 87.4 89.4 89.7 90.3
# main PCPs ever (mean) 2.51 2.53 2.52 3.55
# quarters in sample (mean) 33.9 40.0 40.1 49.0
B. Patient-Qtrs. (thousands) 133,522 61,628 59,988 9,837
Age (years, mean) 76.9 77.1 77.1 78.2
Quarterly Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 2,247 1,292 1,290 1,259
Total util. std. dev. ($) 7,032 3,999 3,996 3,568
Any total util. (%) 90.6 90.6 90.7 91.6
Primary care util. mean ($) 136 97 97 99
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 281 144 144 144
Any primary care util. (%) 69.9 70.7 70.8 71.6
Past Year Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 8,151 5,032 5,026 4,945
Total util. std. dev. ($) 16,122 9,649 9,598 8,686
Primary care util. mean ($) 500 378 377 389
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 666 392 390 399
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for my connected set samples, which I use for
analysis in Section 1.5. Column (1) includes the main analysis sample from Column (5) of Table
1.1. Columns (2) and (3) include the samples that I use for analysis in Section 1.5. Column (2)
includes the patient-quarter connected sets sample that omits the quarters during PCP switches
from Column (4) of Table 1.4. Column (3) includes the patient-quarter leave-out connected sets
sample that omits the quarters during PCP switches. Column (4) includes the patient-quarter
leave-out connected sets sample that omits the quarters during PCP switches and restricts patients
to switchers. The leave-out connected sets samples are composed of the largest connected set in
each market that remains when each patient-PCP pair is separately omitted from the sample and is
identified in the estimation procedure. The patients and PCPs in Column (4) are a subset of those
in Column (3), which are a subset of those in Column (2).
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics for Practice Styles Estimation Samples: Patients in Leave-
Out Connected Sets and during Switch Quarters
Yearly Outcome w/o Switch
Connected Sets Leave-Out Connected Sets
All Qtrs. All Qtrs. Switch Quarters Only
All Involuntary Voluntary
Switches Switches Switches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Patients (thousands) 4,464 4,323 352.9 48.2 310.8
Female (%) 60.4 60.3 60.3 60.1 60.3
White (%) 89.4 89.7 91.8 93.5 91.6
# main PCPs ever (mean) 2.53 2.52 3.66 3.66 3.66
# quarters in sample (mean) 40.0 40.1 46.0 45.5 46.2
B. Patient-Qtrs. (thousands) 61,628 59,988 386.1 48.8 337.3
Age (years, mean) 77.1 77.1 77.1 76.7 77.2
Quarterly Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 1,292 1,290 1,368 1,122 1,404
Total util. std. dev. ($) 3,999 3,996 4,256 3,823 4,314
Any total util. (%) 90.6 90.7 86.3 85.1 86.5
Primary care util. mean ($) 97 97 59 50 61
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 144 144 93 86 94
Any primary care util. (%) 70.7 70.8 52.2 49.9 52.3
Past Year Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 5,032 5,026 4,844 4,023 4,963
Total util. std. dev. ($) 9,649 9,598 9,320 8,099 9,478
Primary care util. mean ($) 378 377 236 202 241
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 392 390 230 207 233
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for my connected set samples, which I use for
analysis in Section 1.5. Columns (1) and (2) include the samples that I use for analysis in Section
1.5. Column (2) includes the patient-quarter connected sets sample from Column (2) of Table A.1.
Column (3) includes the patient-quarter leave-out connected sets sample from Column (3) of Table
A.1. Columns (3)-(5) are restricted to patient-quarter observations that correspond to a switch,
defined as the last quarter a PCP is assigned to a patient. The patient-quarters observations in
Column (3) are split into Columns (4) and (5), and there is some overlap between patients in
Column (4) and Column (5).
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics for Switching Costs Estimation Samples: Patients in Bal-
anced Panels around PCP Switch
Connected Balanced Panel, Switch Quarters Only
Sets Involuntary Switch Voluntary Switch
Sample Same Different Same Different
w/ Switch Group Group Group Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Patients (thousands) 5,184 49.1 57.6 74.2 142.1
Female (%) 59.9 62.2 63.9 65.3 67.5
White (%) 88.9 90.9 89.2 91.2 88.6
# main PCPs ever (mean) 2.56 3.11 3.00 3.24 3.20
# quarters in sample (mean) 38.4 47.5 47.6 47.5 47.2
B. Patient-Qtrs. (thousands) 81,287 49.6 58.0 75.6 145.7
Age (years, mean) 76.7 77.3 77.4 77.5 77.8
Quarterly Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 1,313 1,048 1,209 1,281 1,680
Total util. std. dev. ($) 4,091 3,138 3,305 3,699 4,630
Any total util. (%) 90.0 89.7 90.6 90.2 92.0
Primary care util. mean ($) 95 77 104 94 134
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 147 100 127 131 176
Any primary care util. (%) 69.1 65.1 67.4 66.9 71.0
Past Year Utilization
Total util. mean ($) 5,133 4,427 4,985 5,147 6,539
Total util. std. dev. ($) 9,939 8,339 8,452 8,724 10,791
Primary care util. mean ($) 375 338 411 389 499
Prim. care util. std. dev. ($) 398 287 355 369 485
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for my connected set samples, which I use for
analysis in Section 2.3. Column (1) includes the patient-quarter connected sets sample that includes
the quarters during PCP switches from Column (3) of Table 1.4. Columns (2)-(5) are restricted
to patient-quarter observations that correspond to a switch, defined as the last quarter a PCP is
assigned to a patient, and split by the type of switch. Columns (2)-(3) correspond to involuntary
switches, and Columns (4)-(5) correspond to voluntary switches. Columns (2) and (4) correspond to
switches between PCPs within the same physician practice groups. Columns (3) and (5) correspond
to switches between PCPs in different physician practice groups.
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Table A.5: Practice Styles Results: Variance in Yearly Total Utilization, Estimation Com-
parison
Sample: Connected Set Leave-Out Connected Set
Estimation Method: OLS OLS Leave-Out
(1) (2) (3)
# of within-market estimations 306 306 306
A. Variance and Covariance Estimates (multi-market mean as % share of total variance)
Variance of PCP FEs (%) 19.839 16.968 2.449
Covariance of patient & PCP FEs (%) -16.826 -14.062 0.011
Variance of patient FEs (%) 68.433 65.596
B. Other Statistics and Results (multi-market mean)
# of PCP fixed effects 846 726 726
# of patient-qtr. obs. 370,822 361,421 361,421
Mean of log util. 7.733 7.735 7.735
Std. dev. of log util. 1.271 1.270 1.270
Var. of log util. 1.618 1.616 1.616
Var. of PCP FEs 0.321 0.274 0.040
Std. dev. of PCP FEs 0.552 0.514 0.180
R-squared 0.509 0.507 –
C. Match Model Results (multi-market mean)
R-squared 0.521 – –
Notes: This table reports the results of the 306 within-market estimations of (a) the variance of
primary care physician (PCP) fixed effects (FEs), (b) the covariance of the PCP fixed effects and
the patient fixed effects, and (c) the variance of patient fixed effects in a two-way fixed effects
model with different estimation methods. Column (1) reports the ordinary least squares regression
results, where the sample is the connected set for yearly utilization that omits the switch period in
Column (4) of Table 1.4. Column (2) reports the ordinary least squares regression results, where
the sample is the connected set for yearly utilization that omits the switch period in Column (4)
of Table 1.4 that remains connected when each patient-PCP pair is left out. Column (3) results
from the leave-out patient-PCP match procedure described in Section 1.5.1, where the sample is
the connected set for yearly utilization that omits the switch period in Column (4) of Table 1.4
that remains connected when each patient-PCP pair is left out. The outcome variable is the log of
yearly total utilization in the past year. The PCP fixed effects share, the covariance of PCP fixed
effects and patient fixed effects share, and the patient fixed effects share are means weighted by the
number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market, and the standard errors are computed
accordingly. The standard deviation of the PCP fixed effects is imputed to be zero in markets where
the point estimate of the variance of PCP fixed effects is negative. Markets are hospital referral
regions (HRRs).
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Table A.6: Practice Styles Results: Variance in Yearly Total and Primary Care Utilization,
Weighted versus Unweighted
Total Primary Care
Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of within-market
estimations
306 306 306 306
A. Variance and Covariance Estimates (multi-market mean, SE in parentheses)
Variance of PCP FEs 2.449 2.345 12.626 11.862
as % share of total
variance
(0.136) (0.217) (0.131) (0.211)
Cov. of patient & PCP
FEs
0.011 -0.054 0.173 -0.100
as % share of total
variance
(0.134) (0.214) (0.124) (0.202)
B. Other Statistics and Results (multi-market mean)
# of PCP fixed effects 726 380 726 380
# of patient-qtr. obs. 361,421 196,243 361,421 196,243
Mean of log util. 7.735 7.695 5.599 5.558
Std. dev. of log util. 1.270 1.284 0.791 0.793
Var. of log util. 1.616 1.651 0.628 0.630
Var. of PCP FEs 0.040 0.039 0.080 0.075
Std. dev. of PCP FEs 0.180 0.180 0.275 0.261
Notes: This table reports the results of the 306 within-market estimations of (a) the variance of
primary care physician (PCP) fixed effects (FEs) and (b) the covariance of the PCP fixed effects
and the patient fixed effects in a two-way fixed effects model. The estimation uses patient-quarter
level observations in the leave-out patient-PCP match procedure described in Section 1.5.1. In
Columns (1) and (2), the outcome variable is the log of yearly total utilization in the past year.
In Columns (3) and (4), the outcome variable is the log of yearly primary care utilization in the
past year. Columns (1) and (3) report the unweighted results, and Columns (2) and (4) report the
weighted results. All four columns report the estimates for all 306 markets weighted by the number
of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market. The PCP fixed effects share and the covariance
of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects share are the weighted means of the corresponding
estimates, and the standard errors are computed accordingly. The standard deviation of the PCP
fixed effects is imputed to be zero in markets where the point estimate of the variance of PCP fixed
effects is negative. The sample is the connected set for yearly utilization that omits the switch
period in Column (4) of Table 1.4 that remains connected when each patient-PCP pair is excluded.
Markets are hospital referral regions (HRRs).
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Table A.7: Practice Styles Results: Variance in Yearly Total Utilization, Switchers









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of within-market
estimations
1 1 306 153 153
A. Variance and Covariance Estimates (market/multi-market mean, SE in parentheses)
Variance of PCP FEs 3.105 3.428 2.622 2.491 2.808
as % share of total variance (1.487) (2.072) (0.136) (0.123) (0.277)
Cov. of patient & PCP FEs 1.391 -0.813 0.469 0.874 -0.103
as % share of total variance (1.939) (2.142) (0.140) (0.134) (0.280)
Variance of patient FEs 34.853 19.676 28.385 28.965 27.567
as % share of total variance (4.324) (3.582) (0.276) (0.336) (0.468)
B. Other Statistics and Results (market or multi-market mean)
# of PCP fixed effects 1,011 1,261 726 867 526
# of patient-qtr. obs. 40,823 52,529 60,283 72,731 42,716
Mean of log util. 8.274 7.441 7.763 7.817 7.687
Std. dev. of log util. 1.215 1.217 1.216 1.172 1.275
Var. of log util. 1.374 1.626 1.482 1.480 1.484
Var. of PCP FEs 0.036 0.042 0.039 0.043 0.056
Std. dev. of PCP FEs 0.207 0.236 0.190 0.198 0.180
Explained variance 0.407 0.215 0.312 0.332 0.302
This table reports the results of the 306 within-market estimations of (a) the variance of primary
care physician (PCP) fixed effects (FEs) and (b) the covariance of the PCP fixed effects and the
patient fixed effects in a two-way fixed effects model with only patients who switch PCPs at least
once. The estimation uses patient-quarter level observations in the leave-out patient-PCP match
procedure described in Section 1.5.1. The outcome variable is the log of yearly total utilization in
the past year. Column (1) reports the results for Miami (a high-spending market), and Column (2)
reports the results for Minneapolis (a low-spending market). Column (3) reports the estimates for
all 306 markets weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market. Columns
(4)-(5) report the weighted estimates of the above median and below median markets by spending.
Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A report estimates of the shares of utilization that are the variance
of PCP fixed effects and the covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects along with
their corresponding standard errors. In Columns (3)-(5) of Panel A, the PCP fixed effects share and
the covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects share are the weighted means of the
corresponding estimates, and the standard errors are computed accordingly. The standard deviation
of the PCP fixed effects is imputed to be zero in markets where the point estimate of the variance
of PCP fixed effects is negative. The sample is the connected set for yearly utilization that omits
the switch period in Column (4) of Table 1.4 that remains connected when each patient-PCP pair
is excluded. Markets are hospital referral regions (HRRs).
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Table A.8: Practice Styles Results: Variance in Yearly Primary Care Utilization, Switchers









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of within-market
estimations
1 1 306 153 153
A. Variance and Covariance Estimates (market/multi-market mean, SE in parentheses)
Variance of PCP FEs 19.816 5.924 14.821 15.100 14.427
as % share of total variance (1.266) (2.055) (0.125) (0.126) (0.244)
Cov. of patient & PCP FEs -3.674 -1.428 -1.036 -0.277 -2.107
as % share of total variance (1.511) (2.088) (0.129) (0.127) (0.256)
Variance of patient FEs 12.154 12.736 11.062 11.590 10.316
as % share of total variance (3.616) (3.603) (0.287) (0.340) (0.499)
B. Other Statistics and Results (market or multi-market mean)
# of PCP fixed effects 1,011 1,261 726 867 526
# of patient-qtr. obs. 40,823 52,529 60,283 72,731 42,716
Mean of log util. 6.010 5.313 5.623 5.665 5.564
Std. dev. of log util. 0.784 0.764 0.775 0.871 0.819
Var. of log util. 0.758 0.671 0.603 0.616 0.585
Var. of PCP FEs 0.094 0.085 0.090 0.150 0.040
Std. dev. of PCP FEs 0.388 0.199 0.290 0.302 0.274
Explained variance 0.246 0.158 0.193 0.261 0.205
This table reports the results of the 306 within-market estimations of (a) the variance of primary care
physician (PCP) fixed effects (FEs) and (b) the covariance of the PCP fixed effects and the patient
fixed effects in a two-way fixed effects model with only patients who switch PCPs at least once. The
estimation uses patient-quarter level observations in the leave-out patient-PCP match procedure
described in Section 1.5.1. The outcome variable is the log of yearly primary care utilization in the
past year. Column (1) reports the results for Miami (a high-spending market), and Column (2)
reports the results for Minneapolis (a low-spending market). Column (3) reports the estimates for
all 306 markets weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market. Columns
(4)-(5) report the weighted estimates of the above median and below median markets by spending.
Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A report estimates of the shares of utilization that are the variance
of PCP fixed effects and the covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects along with
their corresponding standard errors. In Columns (3)-(5) of Panel A, the PCP fixed effects share and
the covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects share are the weighted means of the
corresponding estimates, and the standard errors are computed accordingly. The standard deviation
of the PCP fixed effects is imputed to be zero in markets where the point estimate of the variance
of PCP fixed effects is negative. The sample is the connected set for yearly utilization that omits
the switch period in Column (4) of Table 1.4 that remains connected when each patient-PCP pair
is excluded. Markets are hospital referral regions (HRRs).
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Table A.9: Practice Styles Results: Variance in Quarterly Total and Primary Care Utilization
Total Primary Care













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of within-market
estimations
306 153 153 306 153 153
A. Variance and Covariance Estimates (multi-market mean, SE in parentheses)
Variance of PCP FEs 1.201 1.124 1.309 6.209 6.526 5.763
as % share of total variance (0.071) (0.071) (1.141) (0.069) (0.070) (0.134)
Cov. of patient & PCP FEs 0.228 0.449 -0.083 -0.654 -0.491 -0.883
as % share of total variance (0.068) (0.062) (0.140) (0.064) (0.062) (0.127)
B. Other Statistics and Results (multi-market mean)
# of PCP fixed effects 893 1,071 642 893 1,071 642
# of patient-qtr. obs. 438,247 525,690 314,847 438,247 525,690 314,847
Mean of log util. 5.567 5.646 5.456 3.113 3.168 3.035
Std. dev. of log util. 2.245 2.230 2.266 2.201 2.196 2.208
Var. of log util. 5.053 4.983 5.152 4.847 4.825 4.879
Var. of PCP FEs 0.060 0.054 0.068 0.300 0.314 0.279
Std. dev. of PCP FEs 0.246 0.250 0.242 0.539 0.554 0.518
This table reports the results of the 306 within-market estimations of (a) the variance of primary care
physician (PCP) fixed effects (FEs) and (b) the covariance of the PCP fixed effects and the patient
fixed effects in a two-way fixed effects model. The estimation uses patient-quarter level observations
in the leave-out patient-PCP match procedure described in Section 1.5.1. The outcome variable is
the log of quarterly utilization. Columns (1)-(3) report results for log of quarterly total utilization,
and Columns (4)-(5) present results for log of quarterly primary care utilization. Columns (1) and (4)
present the estimates for all 306 markets weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries
in each market. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) report the estimates of the above median and below
median HRRs by market-level spending, weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries
in the market. Panel A reports estimates of the shares of utilization that are the variance of PCP
fixed effects and the covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects as the weighted means
of the corresponding estimates across the within-market estimations, and the standard errors are
computed accordingly. The standard deviation of the PCP fixed effects is imputed to be zero in
markets where the point estimate of the variance of PCP fixed effects is negative. The sample is the
connected set for quarterly utilization that omits the switch period in Column (2) of Table 1.4 that
remains connected when each patient-PCP pair is excluded. Markets are hospital referral regions
(HRRs).
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Table A.10: Practice Styles Results: Variance in Quarterly Tests and Imaging Utilization
Tests Imaging













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of within-market
estimations
306 153 153 306 153 153
A. Variance and Covariance Estimates (multi-market mean, SE in parentheses)
Variance of PCP FEs 2.701 2.871 2.462 1.117 1.189 1.015
as % share of total variance (0.067) (0.062) (0.105) 0.057 0.053 0.117
Cov. of patient & PCP FEs 0.351 0.403 0.278 0.102 0.186 -0.016
as % share of total variance (0.053) (0.056) (0.100) (0.056) (0.050) (0.115)
B. Other Statistics and Results (multi-market mean)
# of PCP fixed effects 893 1,071 642 893 1,071 642
# of patient-qtr. obs. 438,247 525,690 314,847 438,247 525,690 314,847
Mean of log util. 2.814 2.890 2.706 1.945 2.008 1.856
Std. dev. of log util. 2.191 2.200 2.180 2.528 2.560 2.483
Var. of log util. 4.805 4.842 4.753 6.401 6.565 6.169
Var. of PCP FEs 0.130 0.139 0.117 0.072 0.079 0.062
Std. dev. of PCP FEs 0.352 0.367 0.331 0.252 0.268 0.229
Notes: This table reports the results of the 306 within-market estimations of (a) the variance of
primary care physician (PCP) fixed effects (FEs) and (b) the covariance of the PCP fixed effects and
the patient fixed effects in a two-way fixed effects model. The estimation uses patient-quarter level
observations in the leave-out patient-PCP match procedure described in Section 1.5.1. The outcome
variable is the log of quarterly utilization. Columns (1)-(3) report results for log of quarterly tests
utilization, and Columns (4)-(5) present results for log of quarterly imaging utilization. Columns
(1) and (4) present the estimates for all 306 markets weighted by the number of Original Medicare
beneficiaries in each market. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) report the estimates of the above median
and below median HRRs by market-level spending, weighted by the number of Original Medicare
beneficiaries in the market. Panel A reports estimates of the shares of utilization that are the
variance of PCP fixed effects and the covariance of PCP fixed effects and patient fixed effects
as the weighted means of the corresponding estimates across the within-market estimations, and
the standard errors are computed accordingly. The standard deviation of the PCP fixed effects
is imputed to be zero in markets where the point estimate of the variance of PCP fixed effects is
negative. The sample is the connected set for quarterly utilization that omits the switch period in
Column (2) of Table 1.4 that remains connected when each patient-PCP pair is excluded. Markets
are hospital referral regions (HRRs).
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Figure B.1: Relationships among Samples
Selected Population
Table 1, Column (1)
Obs: 210.3 million
Ages 65-99, Fee-for-Service Original
Medicare Parts A&B all months
Main Analysis Sample
Table 1, Column (5)
Obs: 133.5 million
PCP in market with at least 75%
of all PCP visits in past year
Connected Set for Quarterly
Outcome w/ Switch Period
Table 4, Column (3)
Obs: 81.3 million
Not in Connected Set
Connected Set for Quarterly
Outcome w/o Switch Period
Table 4, Column (2)
Obs: 73.4 million
Connected Set for Y early
Outcome w/o Switch Period
Table 4, Column (4)
Obs: 61.6 million
Notes: This figure illustrates the relationships among samples, where the arrows indicate subsets of
samples. The selected population is restricted to (a) years 2002-2011 and (b) patient-quarters during
which patients are 65-99 years old and are enrolled in traditional fee-for-service (Original) Medicare
Parts A and B coverage in all three months as described in Section 1.2.5. The main analysis sample
is restricted to patient-quarters during which the patient is assigned a main PCP in the same HRR
who they visit for at least 75% of PCP visits over the past year as described in Section 1.2.5. The
connected set samples are those described and used in Sections 1.5 and 2.3.
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Year Relative to Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
1to1 1to2 1to3 1to4
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PCP Spending Quartile (Based on Other Patients)

























−2 −1 0 Qtr1 Qtr2−4 2 3
Year Relative to Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
1to1 1to2 1to3 1to4
4to1 4to2 4to3 4to4
PCP Spending Quartile (Based on Other Patients)
Notes: These figures present the mean demographics-adjusted log utilization for patients who switch
PCPs as described in Section 1.3.1. The sample includes only consistent patient-PCP matches, who
are assigned the origin PCP for 12 quarters before the switch and the destination PCP for 12
quarters after the switch as described in Column (3) of Table 1.6. Each of the patients who switch
is classified into quartiles, defined within markets, by their origin PCP’s other patients (“copatients”)
in a pre-switch period (year -1) and their destination PCP’s copatients in a post-switch period (year
2). Quarters are binned into years, such that year 0 includes the last 4 quarters with a patient’s
origin PCP. The first quarter with the destination PCP is separated from the remainder of the year.
Log utilization is adjusted for utilization for patient age, gender, and cohort/date.
APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL FIGURES 82





















−12 −10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Quarter Relative to Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
1to1 1to2 1to3 1to4
4to1 4to2 4to3 4to4
PCP Spending Quartile (Based on Other Patients)

























−12 −10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Quarter Relative to Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
1to1 1to2 1to3 1to4
4to1 4to2 4to3 4to4
PCP Spending Quartile (Based on Other Patients)
Notes: These figures present the mean demographics-adjusted log utilization for patients who switch
PCPs. The sample includes only consistent patient-PCP matches, who are assigned the origin PCP
for 12 quarters before the switch and the destination PCP for 12 quarters after the switch as
described in Column (3) of Table 1.6. Each of the patients who switch is classified into quartiles,
defined within markets, by their origin PCP’s other patients (“copatients”) in a pre-switch period
(year -1) and their destination PCP’s copatients in a post-switch period (year 2). For clarity, I
include only switchers from quartile 1 and quartile 4. Log utilization is adjusted for utilization for
patient age, gender, and cohort/date.
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Notes: Each of these figures presents the distribution of 306 within-market estimated variances
of primary care physician (PCP) fixed effects as shares of the total variance of utilization. The
variance estimates come from a two-way fixed effects model with patient fixed effects and PCP
fixed effects. The estimation uses patient-quarter level observations in the leave-out patient-PCP
match procedure described in Section 1.5.1. The outcome variable in the estimations is the log
of quarterly utilization. In Panel (a), the outcome variable is the log of quarterly total utilization
and the estimates correspond with the results in Columns (1)-(3) of Table A.9. In Panel (b), the
outcome variable is the log of quarterly primary care utilization and the estimates correspond with
the results in Columns (4)-(6) of Table A.9. The histogram is unweighted, and the kernel density
plots are unweighted and weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market.
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−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8
Quarter Relative to PCP Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
Invol, Diff Prac Grp Invol, Same Prac Grp
Vol, Diff Prac Grp Vol, Same Prac Grp 95% CI
Notes: Each of these figures plots the event study estimates from 306 within-market event study
regressions weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market as described
in Section 2.3.1. The outcome variable in the regressions is the log of quarterly utilization. In Panel
(a), the outcome variable is the log of quarterly total utilization. In Panel (b), the outcome variable
is the log of quarterly primary care utilization. Each event study regression includes a primary care
physician (PCP) fixed effect, a patient fixed effect, sets of event time indicators corresponding to
types of switches, and controls for age, gender, and date/cohort. For each of the switch type, the
event study regression includes a set of event time indicators for a balanced panel of patients who
are always assigned the origin PCP for 6 quarters before the switch and the destination PCP for
8 quarters after a switch. The sample is the connected set for quarterly utilization that does not
omit the switch period in Column (3) of Table 1.4.
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−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8
Quarter Relative to PCP Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
Invol, Diff Prac Grp Invol, Same Prac Grp
Vol, Diff Prac Grp Vol, Same Prac Grp 95% CI
Notes: Each of these figures plots the event study estimates from 306 within-market event study
regressions weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market as described
in Section 2.3.1. The outcome variable in the regressions is the log of quarterly utilization. In Panel
(a), the outcome variable is the log of quarterly tests utilization. In Panel (b), the outcome variable
is the log of quarterly imaging utilization. Each event study regression includes a primary care
physician (PCP) fixed effect, a patient fixed effect, sets of event time indicators corresponding to
types of switches, and controls for age, gender, and date/cohort. For each of the switch type, the
event study regression includes a set of event time indicators for a balanced panel of patients who
are always assigned the origin PCP for 6 quarters before the switch and the destination PCP for
8 quarters after a switch. The sample is the connected set for quarterly utilization that does not
omit the switch period in Column (3) of Table 1.4.
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Figure B.7: Switching Costs: Emergency Department and Hospital Inpatient Utilization
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Quarter Relative to PCP Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
Invol, Diff Prac Grp Invol, Same Prac Grp
Vol, Diff Prac Grp Vol, Same Prac Grp 95% CI
Notes: Each of these figures plots the event study estimates from 306 within-market event study
regressions weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market as described
in Section 2.3.1. The outcome variable in the regressions is the log of quarterly utilization. In
Panel (a), the outcome variable is the log of quarterly emergency department utilization. In Panel
(b), the outcome variable is the log of quarterly hospital inpatient utilization. Each event study
regression includes a primary care physician (PCP) fixed effect, a patient fixed effect, sets of event
time indicators corresponding to types of switches, and controls for age, gender, and date/cohort.
For each of the switch type, the event study regression includes a set of event time indicators for a
balanced panel of patients who are always assigned the origin PCP for 6 quarters before the switch
and the destination PCP for 8 quarters after a switch. The sample is the connected set for quarterly
utilization that does not omit the switch period in Column (3) of Table 1.4.
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Figure B.8: Switching Costs: Specialty Care Utilization
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Quarter Relative to PCP Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
Invol, Diff Prac Grp Invol, Same Prac Grp
Vol, Diff Prac Grp Vol, Same Prac Grp 95% CI
Notes: This figures plots the event study estimates from 306 within-market event study regressions
weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market as described in Section
2.3.1. The outcome variable in the regressions is the log of quarterly utilization. In Panel (a),
the outcome variable is the log of quarterly specialty care utilization. Each event study regression
includes a primary care physician (PCP) fixed effect, a patient fixed effect, sets of event time
indicators corresponding to types of switches, and controls for age, gender, and date/cohort. For
each of the switch type, the event study regression includes a set of event time indicators for a
balanced panel of patients who are always assigned the origin PCP for 6 quarters before the switch
and the destination PCP for 8 quarters after a switch. The sample is the connected set for quarterly
utilization that does not omit the switch period in Column (3) of Table 1.4.
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Quarter Relative to PCP Switch (0 = Last with Origin Main PCP)
Different Practice Group Same Practice Group 95% CI
Notes: Each of these figures plots the event study estimates from 306 within-market event study
regressions weighted by the number of Original Medicare beneficiaries in each market as described in
Section 2.3.1 in which the involuntary and voluntary switchers share a set of event time indicators.
The outcome variable in the regressions is the log of quarterly utilization. In Panel (a), the outcome
variable is the log of quarterly total utilization. In Panel (b), the outcome variable is the log of
quarterly primary care utilization. Each event study regression includes a primary care physician
(PCP) fixed effect, a patient fixed effect, sets of event time indicators corresponding to types of
switches, and controls for age, gender, and date/cohort. For each of the switch type, the event
study regression includes a set of event time indicators for a balanced panel of patients who are
always assigned the origin PCP for 6 quarters before the switch and the destination PCP for 8
quarters after a switch. The sample is the connected set for quarterly utilization that does not omit




C.1 Model of Healthcare Demand and Supply
I extend healthcare demand and supply model from Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams
(2016) – henceforth FGW – to explicitly capture dynamics of patients switching physicians.
I present one modification to introduce a parameter that captures switching costs, though
there are other modifications that could yield the same econometric model defined in Section
1.4.1.
On the demand side, patient i in time t utilizes health care yit ∈ R+. Patients differ
along several dimensions: health status hit, physician switching status sit, preferences ηi,
and physician j (i, t). I introduce physician switching status sit to capture differences in in-
formation acquisition, productivity, etc. associated with new physician-patient relationship.
Consistent with FGW, I assume patients’ expected continuation utility u () is
u (yit|hit, sit, ηi) = −1
2
(yit − (hit + sit))2 + ηiyit
such that u () is maximized at y∗it = hit + sit + ηi, level of care patient would choose if fully
informed and faced a zero out-of-pocket price for care.
On the supply side, physician j (i, t) in time t chooses health care yit ∈ R+ with
yit = arg max
y
u˜j(i,t) (yit|hit, sit, ηi)− PCj(i,t),t (yit)
As in FGW, u˜j(i,t) (yit) is the perceived utility of patients, and PCj(i,t),t (yit) is the normal
(net, private) costs of care provision. Maximization of the physician’s decision problem
yields:
yit = hit + sit + ηi + λj(i,t) − PC ′j(i,t),t ()
The model can be written as the following two-way fixed-effect model, with two key
assumptions, such that pitδ capture the costs of switching physicians
yit = αi + γj + τt + xitβ + pitδ + it
Following FGW, I assume that the expectation of y∗it = hit+sit+ηi depends only on a patient
fixed effect αi, time-varying observables xit, and indicators for periods pre/post-switch pit,
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such that E [y∗it| {i, t, xit, pit}] = αi + xitβ + pitδ. As in FGW, I also assume PCjt () is linear
in y and additively separable in j and t, with γj + τt = λj − PC ′jt ().
In my setting, the pitδ are the event study indicators defined in Sections 1.4.1 and 2.3.1.
C.2 Practice Style Variation in Quarterly Utilization Sam-
ple and Results
This section discusses the sample and results for the quarterly utilization outcome measure.
As for the yearly utilization outcome measure, I omit any observation that would include
part of a switch period in its outcome measure, which means that I omit five periods of
outcomes (i.e., event times -3 to +1, where 0 is defined as the last quarter a patient is
assigned their origin PCP).1 Column (2) of Table 1.4 reports the descriptive statistics for
this sample, which are similar to those for yearly utilization outcomes in Column (4) of Table
1.4. Figure B.1 illustrates the relationship of this sample to others used in this dissertation.
Table A.9 reports the results for quarterly total utilization and quarterly primary care
utilization. Figure B.4 reports the distribution of the estimated variances across markets.
Differences in PCP practice styles explain 1.2% of variance in total quarterly utilization and
6.2% of the variance in primary care quarterly utilization on average across markets, which
are approximately half of the corresponding percentages estimated for yearly utilization.
This difference primarily comes from the greater variability in quarterly utilization data.2
I compare the total utilization and primary care utilization results to other categories of
healthcare utilization, specifically tests and imaging, which PCPs often use for diagnosis and
preventive care. Table A.10 reports the results for tests utilization and imaging utilization.
Differences in PCP practice styles explain substantially less of the variation in tests utilization
than in primary care utilization, but more than in total utilization or in imaging. Differences
in PCP practice styles explain about the same amount of the variation in imaging as they
do in total utilization.
C.3 Data and Variable Details
C.3.1 Physician Data Sources
I use several additional physician datasets for physician characteristics and physician practice
group characteristics.
• CMS Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Specialty (MD-PPAS). This dataset
uses the physician national provider identifier (NPI) and the physician billing tax
identification number (TIN), which I use to define physician practice groups. The file
1One advantage is that this contemporaneous quarterly estimation reduces the number of observations I
exclude in order to fully omit the “switch period.” The disadvantages are that there is more noise in quarterly
utilization data and some observations have zero utilization.
2The results on yearly utilization data from Section 1.6 are more interpretable and relevant from a policy
perspective.
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assigns Medicare providers to medical practices based on tax identification numbers
(TINs) and provides information provider specialty classification.
• CMS National Plan and Provider Enumeration System (NPPES). This dataset is pub-
licly available and uses the physician national provider identifier (NPI). The dataset
provides links to the CMS Unique Physician Identification Number (UPIN), physician
names, and other physician identifiers.3
• Unique Physician Identification Number (UPIN) Directory. This dataset uses the
physician Unique Physician Identification Number (UPIN). The dataset provides in-
formation on the physician full name, specialty, license state code, zip code, Medicare
provider billing number, and state.4
• Unique Physician Identification Number (UPIN) Group File. This dataset uses the
physician practice group Unique Physician Identification Number (UPIN). The dataset
provides information on the physician practice group.5
• American Medical Association (AMA) Physician Masterfile.6 The dataset provides
information on the education, training and professional certification of Doctors of
Medicine (MD) and Doctors of Osteopathic Medicine (DO).
C.3.2 Physician Definitions
C.3.2.1 Identification of Physicians
I identify unique physicians using the Carrier (Physician/Supplier Part B claims) data,
which include information on the performing provider. The most direct way to identify
the performing physician is to use the physician Unique Provider Identification Number
(UPIN) until 2007 and the physician National Provider Identifier (NPI) starting in 2007.
The main challenge is that the performing UPIN or NPI may not be entered correctly
or represent the performing provider. In some cases, primarily in earlier years, (a) physician
group practices may have systematically entered the incorrect physician UPIN when it was
not tied to reimbursement (e.g., selecting the physician at the top of an alphabetical list
rather than the actual performing physician), and (b) nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician
assistants (PAs) billed under a physician NPI rather than their own NPIs.
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) offers a crosswalk between the
UPIN and the NPI based on the CMS National Plan and Provider Enumeration System
(NPPES).7 I verify and improve upon the crosswalk by using additional information from
various CMS datasets. I use physician names from the UPIN Member File, the Medicare
Physician Identification and Eligibility Records (MPIER) file, and the Medicare Data on
Provider Practice and Specialty (MD-PPAS).
3Source: https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Administrative-






APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 92
C.3.2.2 Specialty Classification
I classify physicians based on the CMS (formerly Health Care Finance Administration
(HCFA)) provider specialty codes in the Carrier data associated with line items of claims.8
Primary care physicians are identified by general practice (01), family practice (08), internal
medicine (11), or geriatric medicine (38).
C.3.3 Claims Data
My outcome measures include the following categories.
• Total utilization. Total utilization includes all physician claims, inpatient claims, and
outpatient claims. Total utilization excludes skilled nursing facility, home health care,
hospice, and durable medical equipment claims
• Primary care utilization. Primary care consists of Evaluation and Management (E&M)
line items in claims associated with physician who have a primary care specialty: gen-
eral practice (01), family practice (08), internal medicine (11), osteopathic manipu-
lative therapy (12), pediatric medicine (37), geriatric medicine (38), public health or
welfare agencies (federal, state, and local) (60), preventive medicine (84), nurse prac-
titioner (50), and physician assistant (97). Primary care utilization includes but is not
limited to services provided by main PCPs.
• Tests. Tests consists of Carrier claims with Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS)
codes that begin with the letter “T” and outpatient claims with HCPCS codes that
correspond to BETOS codes that begin with the letter “T.”9
• Imaging. Imaging consists of Carrier claims with Berenson-Eggers Type of Service
(BETOS) codes that begin with the letter “I” and outpatient claims with HCPCS
codes that correspond to BETOS codes that begin with the letter “I.”
• Emergency department visits. Emergency department claims include outpatient claims
and inpatient claims.
• Inpatient hospitalization. Inpatient hospitalization claims include claims in the Inpa-
tient file that are not classified as emergency department visits.
• Speciality care. Specialty care consists of Evaluation and Management (E&M) line
items in claims associated with physician who have a medical specialty or a surgi-
cal specialty. Medical specialties include: allergy/immunology (03), cardiology (06),
dermatology (07), gastroenterology (10), neurology (13), physical medicine and reha-
bilitation (25), psychiatry (26), pulmonary disease (29), nephrology (39), infectious
disease (44), endocrinology (46), rheumatology (66), slide preparation facilities (75),
8Source: https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/
MedicareProviderSupEnroll/Downloads/TaxonomyCrosswalk.pdf.
9BETOS codes are assigned for each Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure
Coding System (HCPCS) procedure code. Source: https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareFeeforSvcPartsAB/downloads/betosdesccodes.pdf.
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addiction medicine (79), critical care(81), hematology (82), hematology/oncology (83),
neuropsychiatry (86), and medical oncology (90). Surgical specialties include: general
surgery (02), otolaryngology (04), interventional pain management (09), neurosurgery
(14), obstetrics/gynecology (16), ophthalmology (18), oral surgery (19), orthopedic
surgery (20), plastic and reconstructive surgery (24), colorectal surgery (28), thoracic
surgery (33), urology (34), hand surgery (40), ambulatory surgical center (49), periph-
eral vascular disease (76), vascular surgery (77), cardiac surgery (78), maxillofacial
surgery (85), surgical oncology (91), and gynecologist/oncologist (98).
